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Abstract 
The choice to study earnings quality derives from an intensive study of Eikon, that is 
a source of every kind of information about companies; the range goes from the typical financial 
statement to every press release, price per shares, ownership structure and so on. However, 
during the studying of all the elements presented by Eikon, the attention was captured by the 
StarMine score for Earnings quality. In fact, Thomson Reuters uses this model to provide a 
measure for EQ to all the listed companies, and it is updated daily. This method is composed 
of 4 parts: accruals, cash flows, operating efficiency and exclusion and it is ranked in centiles, 
moreover each of these 4 components have its own score. Therefore, the curiosity was to 
compare this model with the ones presented in literature, as Jones model (1991), modified 
Jones model (1995), Dechow and Dichev (2002), Francis et al. (2005), smoothness (Leuz et 
al., 2003) and earnings persistence. The first goal of the analysis is to provide or not evidence 
of a possible correlation between Eikon and these 7 metrics. In order to evaluate this, we 
distribute the EQ from literature in quantiles to lead the comparison possible and then we 
perform several t tests and regressions. The result is of no correlation between StarMine model 
and the other scores. Moreover, we conduct a regression with the components of the models to 
test whether they are correlated with Eikon or not. We conclude that the majority of the proxies 
parts are significantly correlated with StarMine, unless the coefficients are not so high. 
Then, the second goal of the analysis deals with the determinants of earnings quality. 
In fact, in the first chapter of this work, we introduce all the model presented in literature, and 
we divide, as proposed by Dechow et al. (2010), papers in determinants and consequences of 
EQ. Indeed, scholars could analyse how a company choice, or an external factors or other 
phenomena could affect the final score of EQ or how this latter affects these events. Therefore, 
in the first case earnings quality is the independent variable and in the second the dependent. 
Moreover, the important part is to analyse if the different proxy for EQ provide similar 
evidences under the same determinant/consequence or they are in contrast, namely they give 
dissimilar results because the metric concentrates on particular feature of a company, so they 
describe unique part of the entirety.  
Therefore, given these assumptions, we identify three determinants that are peculiar in 
the food processing industry, thus accounting treatment for inventory, covering or not 
commodity risk and business model. In particular, the latter is the innovative part of the 
analysis as the topic is not well developed in literature. The discrimination under this 
determinant is whether a company produces frozen or fresh food, namely we provide 4 
distinctions, the first one is based on segmental reporting in 10-K, for the other three we apply 
threshold of % revenue derived from frozen foods. 
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Furthermore, for inventory we discriminate companies from the ones choosing FIFO 
and the ones choosing LIFO or WEIGHTED AVERAGE. 
To assess whether a choice produce more quality, we perform t tests to compare the 
means and then also robustness checks. We provide evidence that companies that enter into 
derivative contracts have higher EQ for substantially all the proxies used, whereas LIFO and 
WEIGHTED AVERAGE vs FIFO is not robust to check proposed, unless from t tests the 
evidence is to higher quality for the latter. Finally, for business model we underline that 
companies that produce frozen food have higher quality, even though it suffers a little from 
cluster effects. 
Finally, we determine what features of the companies are described by the different 
proxies under the three determinants, as even there is the case to same results, the information 
provided by each score is different. 
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Chapter 1: Literature review 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Researchers have been studying earnings quality during the last thirty years, because it 
is a useful instrument to analyse a broad spectrum of economics pattern, such as the asymmetry 
information in the market, the quality of the accounting systems, to compare cross sectional 
data at industry and country levels, to determine the quality of current and future performances 
of a company; therefore there are a lot of papers dealing with earnings quality. Nevertheless, 
there is not a clear and shareble definition of the metric in question, because, as stated above, 
in the literature earning quality are widely used and so the goal of the analysis varies a lot, hence 
the definition in each study depends on the final object of the paper. Moreover, earnings quality 
per se is not meaningful, it is necessary to put this concept into a context under a specific 
decision model. Indeed, the results of the scores, that could be positive or negative numbers or 
taken as absolute value, should be tested, going beyond their value, if these give qualitative 
information about the financial performance of a firm, considering that most of the time 
performance is due to unobservable aspects. Finally, earnings quality is a combination of 
underlying financial performance and the ability of the accounting system to measure it. 
Therefore, for this aspect earnings quality could be analysed by different perspectives, looking 
at the representation of financial performance that the author wants to highlight (Dechow et al., 
2010). 
For the problems of the absence of a common explanation of EQ, the peculiarity 
described by the metrics, each of these capture different aspects of companies performances, 
and the limited ability of accounting system to reflect the real nature of business, it is more 
appropriate to identify the metrics of EQ and define them, instead of trying to give a unique 
definition; even though those scores have not been validated by all the researchers. In fact, there 
are a lot of modification and everyone gives its own interpretation of the model; the 
straightforward example is the Jones Model (1991) that is the base in detecting abnormal 
accruals, and it has been subject to different interpretations and modifications.  
Given the complexity of providing a definition, the right approach to follow now is to 
present the different metrics of earnings quality most used in the literature and, after that, to 
provide a deeper analysis of those scores. We follow the distinction provides by Dechow et al. 
(2010), who have analysed more than 300 papers on earnings quality, to divide the proxies in 
three different categories: 
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 Properties of earnings: earnings persistence and accruals, earnings smoothness, 
asymmetric timeliness and timely loss recognition, target beating, earnings 
management; 
 Investor responsiveness to earnings: considering the earnings response coefficient or 
R squared taken by earnings return model as a proxy 
 External indicator of earnings misstatement: AAERs, restatement and SOX. 
For each of the metrics there are different interpretations provided by the authors during 
the last decades. This is due to the fact that, being huge the spectrum of the analysis, every 
researcher tries to better design the model to have final results that provide the best explanation 
of the topic chosen. Therefore, it is impossible to determine what is the best measures among 
those presented in the literature. Furthermore, in some cases for the same proxies, see e.g. the 
case of earnings smoothness, a lower score could indicate a higher quality (Francis et al., 2014), 
whereas for others (Leuz et al., 2003) a low metrics indicate a lower quality. We would discuss 
those issues in the next section. 
Another problem in literature is the focus of the researchers’ analysis. Indeed, EQ 
depends on the financial performance of the company and how the accounting system measures 
it. There is little empirical evidence of how the fundamental performance influences earnings 
quality, because the focus is more on distortion associated with implementation errors and 
earnings management, whereas it would be better to concentrate on the  sources of distortion  
that trigger the ability of the accounting system to capture fundamental performance. It would 
be better to distinguish the contribution of the two components in the finale scores (Dechow et., 
al 2010).  
The question now is how to deal with these two problems presented among all the 
studies, namely the inability to find the best score and the wrong focus of scholars, who analyse 
mostly the distortions affecting EQ, rather than the sources of those distortions that influence 
real performances of firms. The possible solution suggested by Dechow et al. (2010) is to 
decompose papers into two categories, determinants and consequences of earnings quality, 
and after that analysing the results in the same category of the different proxies provided by the 
literature. In the first category we find papers that use EQ as the dependent variable, whereas 
in the second it is used as the independent one. Using this approach, it is possible to assess if 
different proxies lead to the same results or have mixed effects. If we take the same determinants 
or the same consequences of a specific topic, we could determine whether two or more proxies 
used in different papers would have a convergence results or mixed ones. Indeed, in most 
papers, researchers use a mix of earnings quality to provide a single measure, but it is not 
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obvious or demonstrated that using a combination of proxies have a higher validation rather 
than picking up one. Of course, the use of a multiple model could have a broader spectrum and 
provide more insight, unless the specification of the model is not necessarily higher than using 
one proxy. There is no evidence that the proxies capture the same construct, a part of it or even 
different constructs. (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2011).  As Dechow et al. (2010 pp. 345) states: 
“If earnings quality were a single construct and the proxies just measured it with 
varying degrees of accuracy, then we would expect to observe convergent validity across 
EQ proxies for the same determinant and to find that all the EQ proxies would have 
similar consequences. Juxtaposing the papers against other papers that examine the same 
determinant or the same consequence draws attention to mixed evidence in the literature. 
If a particular determinant is not associated with all proxies, or if various proxies do not 
have the same consequences, then the proxies are measuring different constructs.” 
Finally, it is common to see the relationship between different measures, the correlation 
among those, but it should be better to provide a deeper analysis through future researches on 
this topic, because it would enhance the quality of the analysis or would validate that a 
compound metric of proxies is better than one or vice versa. The possible development, as we 
see in next sections, in EQ literature is very ample even if the topic has been treated for more 
than 30 years. 
1.2 Earnings quality measures: models presentation 
In the following sections we describe the most used model to calculate the different 
proxies of earnings quality. The first part deals with properties of earnings that are divided in 
earnings persistence, abnormal accruals, earnings smoothness, timeliness and timely loss 
recognition and target beating. Among these subgroups, earnings or components of those, 
such as cash flow or accruals, are taken as dependent or independent variable to estimate the 
EQ.  
Then, we analyse investor responsiveness to earnings. In this case the subject of the 
analysis is the relation between unexpected return and unexpected earnings.  
After that, the last model concern external indicator of earnings misstatement, that could 
be AAERs, restatement or SOX. 
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1.2.1 Properties of earnings 
 
1.2.1.1 Earnings persistence 
The first property is earnings persistence, that is a simple time series regression of 
forward earnings on current earnings. The model is: 
 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠௧ାଵ =  𝛼 +  𝛽ଵ ×  𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠௧  +  𝜀௧ 
 
In the equation α is the constant, β is the coefficient that indicate the relation between 
forward earnings and current ones, while ɛ is the estimation error that is typical of every 
regression. 
Usually earnings are scaled by average total assets between year t and t+1, but it is possible also 
to find some papers where they are scaled by sales or number of shares (Dechow et al., 2010). 
Therefore, the metric of quality in this case is β from the regression model, higher this value 
higher the quality, because it means that the transitory errors from low accruals do not reduce 
the persistence of the earnings stream. Of course, there could be some cases in which earnings 
are persistent because of the economic environment, because of the competition of the market 
and so on, and not because of the high-quality accruals (Nezloblin et al., 2019). As for most of 
the models, this equation was enhanced by Sloan (1996) who decompose earnings into cash 
flow component (CF) and accruals one.  
 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠௧ାଵ =  𝛼 +  𝛽ଵ ×  𝐶𝐹௧  +  𝛽ଶ  ×  𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠௧  +  𝜀௧ 
 
In this case, we have two parameters to assess the relation between earnings and CF and 
accruals, respectively β1 and β2. 
Sloan (1996) illustrates that β2<β1, so cash flow is more persistent than accruals. Moreover, 
the literature has evolved to take into consideration other elements that could influence the 
predictability of future earnings, even items that come from the footnotes of annual report.  
 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠௧ାଵ =  𝛼 +  𝛿ଵ ×  𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠௧  + 𝛿ଶ  ×  𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠௧  
+  𝛿ଷ  ×  𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௧  +  𝜀௧ 
 
The possible evolution in this field of earnings quality could be to assess whether the 
persistence is driven by the accounting system that measures the performance or fundamental 
performances themselves. There are some contributions in literature that try to isolate the role 
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of fundamental performance, such as to compare firms that applies a differentiation strategy or 
cost leadership (Soliman, 2008). Therefore, the path for the future development in earnings 
persistence is the one just explained (Dechow et al., 2010). 
 
1.2.1.2 Abnormal accruals model 
This part of earnings quality is the most developed in literature and we have a lot of 
contribution in terms of models presented during last decades and studies conducted, most of 
the time they are cross sectional studies across industries or countries (see Table 3 with the 
summary of all the most used model and the Appendix for the evolution of these). Before 
introducing the different methods proposed, it is important to stress the concept of normal and 
abnormal accruals. Indeed, the former should represent the fundamental performance of a 
company, while the latter should reflect misspecifications produced by the application of 
accounting rules or earnings management. Therefore, researchers endeavour to separate the 
two components when they analyse the quality of accruals and so EQ, to assess the problem of 
accounting measurements. Moreover, in literature it is common to see abnormal accruals that 
are defined as discretionary and normal as nondiscretionary accruals, so they are 
interchangeable. This could lead to think that discretionary is a voluntary choice of the company 
rather than an error in the accounting measurement; however, the interchangeably is widely 
spread among papers. The final observation, before introducing the models, is the positive 
correlation between the level of total accruals and the abnormal part. This is important to 
underline because if the amount of discretionary accruals is linked to the level of total, it is not 
easy to determine whether the result of these abnormal accruals derives from the accounting 
distortion or from this correlation; indeed, in the latter case they would reflect a part of 
fundamental performance rather than a misspecification, so it would be a signal of a not so well 
specified accruals models (Dechow et al., 2010). 
The first model to analyse is the Jones model (1991). Indeed, it is the starting point of 
most analyses and the one subject to more modifications during last year, namely scholars 
propose their own model usually referring to Jones’ contribution and then providing their 
interpretation. Moreover, the number of citations is growing year by year, as November 2019 
the value is more than 8400, therefore even though the paper is about 30 years old, it is still 
important and a benchmark in literature. Finally, she was the first to understand that the 
economic performance of firms could affect the level of accruals, both normal and abnormal 
accruals, as she proposed to control for Property plant and equipment but most important the 
delta revenues.  
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 In her paper Jones wants to detect the level of earnings management among 5 different 
industries, automobiles, carbon steel, stainless steel, copper, and footwear, looking at the 
accounting choices of the company in response of the ITC’s injury determination in order to 
obtain their required level. She started with a sample of 49 companies among the different 
industries and, after having applied some restricted criteria, such as the time series on data, she 
restricts the sample to 23 companies. She takes as starting point DeAngelo 1986 model, where 
earnings management is detected by the annual change in discretionary accruals (DA), while 
nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) should be stationary. 
 
 ∆𝑇𝐴௧  =  (𝑇𝐴௧  −  𝑇𝐴௧ି௞)  =  (𝐷𝐴௧ −  𝐷𝐴௧ି௞)  −  (𝑁𝐴௧𝑡 – 𝑁𝐴௧ି௞).  
 
To relax the assumption provided by the DeAngelo that the change in total accruals are 
due only to abnormal accruals because the NDA are constant, Jones proposed her model, where 
she also changes the definition of total accruals (TA), and controls accruals using change in 
revenues (REV) and gross property plant and equipment (PPE) of the year in order to take into 
consideration the economic circumstances of companies and also to state that even 
nondiscretionary accruals could affect TA. All the elements in the equation are scaled by lagged 
total assets (A).  
 
𝑇𝐴௧  =  [∆𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠௧  − ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ௧]  − [∆𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠௧]  
−  𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒௧ 
Therefore, the model is: 
 
𝑇𝐴௜௧/𝐴௜௧ିଵ  =  𝛼 ଵ ×  [1/𝐴௜௧ିଵ]  +  𝛽ଵ௜ ×  [∆𝑅𝐸𝑉௜௧/ 𝐴௜௧ିଵ]  +  𝛽௜ଶ  ×  [𝑃𝑃𝐸௜௧/𝐴௜௧ିଵ]  +  ɛ௜௧ 
 
All the elements in the two equation are provided by Compustat. 
This model was proposed for detecting earnings management, that is different from 
earnings quality, but researchers started to use it also to give a measure of quality. Indeed, the 
measure of EQ is the residuals from the equation, typically the absolute value of those one. 
Despite being the most used method, it is subject to some problems that lead to errors both of 
Type I and Type II1.  
 
1 In statistic we deal with two types of error when we perform a regression, namely Type I and Type II. The 
analysis is based on the null hypothesis H0 that could be accepted or rejected. Nevertheless, there are cases in 
which the null hypothesis is true, but the results of the regression bring the scholar to reject it, Type I error, or in 
the opposite case, H0 is false unless the decision is to accept it. Type I is also called false positive and the Type II 
is called false negative. 
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In most researches there are evidence of Type I and Type II errors. Son-Hyon and 
Sivaramakrishnan (1995) compare the Jones model with another two, one using the 
instrumental variable IV2 and the other using the generalized method of moment, to demonstrate 
that those ones are more powerful than the Jones model in both cases. They use a sample of 
2829 companies provided by Primary-Supplementary-Tertiary (PST) file, 1181 firms, and the 
Research (Merged) file, 1648 enterprises. To test for Type II errors the authors selected 100 
companies randomly and they casually add positive accruals to some firms, and they test if the 
three models could detect earnings management. For Type I, they do the same random analysis, 
but they do not add new accruals, they only test to see the tendency to yield false rejection, 
dividing the analysis for all firms, companies with an increasing ROA and with decreasing 
ROA.  
As Table 1 shows, for Type II error the models proposed by the authors are more powerful 
in correctly rejecting the null hypothesis, indeed we pass from 23% to 47%, see the first column. 
Whereas the tendency to lead to a false rejection is lower in the three cases for IV instrumental 
variable and GMM model respect to the Jones model, as column 2,3,4 show. (Son-Hyon, 
Sivaramakrishnan, 1995). 
Another critic comes from Xie (2001) who wants to assess the forecast ability of 
discretionary accruals to predict year-ahead stock prices. He uses a sample of 7506 firms and 
data that range from 1971 to 1992, taken from Compustat. He performs the Mishkin3 (1983) 
test to five development of cross-sectional Jones model: the cross- sectional modified Jones 
model (Dechow et al., 1995); the time-series Jones model; the time-series modified Jones model 
(Dechow et al., 1995); the Beneish (1997) model; and the Beneish (1998) model.   
It is important to underline that the residuals for these five models are highly correlated 
with the Jones model, therefore the conclusions in the paper are valid also for this model and 
for this reason we put the conclusion of Xie in this paragraph (Xie, 2001). Indeed, Xie shows 
that the market overprices abnormal accruals, while there is a correct evaluation for 
nondiscretionary accruals, therefore it leads to say that discretionary accruals have lower ability 
to forecast year-ahead earnings rather than normal accruals (Dechow et al., 2010). 
 
2 The instrumental variable iv is used in statistic when there is the possibility of correlation between the dependent 
variable is correlated with the error, therefore the estimation of the coefficient under the OLS could be biased. This 
iv variable, instead, will give consistent coefficient. 
3 Mishkin test leads to the rational estimation of the accounting component in stock markets, moreover it is used 
for macroeconometrics testing for market efficiency. In the case of Xie’s paper there are two regressions, one that 
estimates the parameter for abnormal accruals in the forecast equation, the second analyse the parameter taken 
from the pricing equation. Then you should compare the valuation and forecast parameters, in this case of 
discretionary accruals, to assess if there is an overpricing or underpricing.  
10 
 
Table 1: Type I and Type II error in the three specification. From Son and Sivaramakrishnan. 
   
 
Moreover, Type I error could increase because the correlation between DA and TA is 
high, so it could be possible to have huge value of abnormal accruals because of high value of 
total ones, not for earnings management. Furthermore, there is a positive correlation between 
DA and earnings performance, while it is negative with CF performance, thus the three elements 
could bias the results obtained in the regression (Dechow et al., 2010). 
The biggest contribution for the Jones model comes from Dechow et al. (1995) that 
propose their modified version of the model. Indeed, they try to overcome the assumption that 
companies do not manage revenues4, because it is usually that firms manipulate receivables 
to decide when to collect cash from these revenues. Moreover, the modification proposed by 
Dechow et al. (1995) leads to consider also companies that manage earnings through revenue 
recognition, whereas with Jones model these firms could be considered with low or zero 
manipulation in earnings, thus higher EQ. Finally, there is more discretion in case of recognize 
a credit sale than cash sale, therefore it is more suitable to manage earnings in the first case. So, 
another problem not detected by Jones model. 
 
 
4 Dechow et al. (1995, pp. 8) state that: “The original Jones Model implicitly assumes that discretion is not 
exercised over revenue in either the estimation period or the event period. The modified version of the Jones Model 
implicitly assumes that all changes in credit sales in the event period result from earnings management. This is 
based on the reasoning that it is easier to manage earnings by exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue 
on credit sales than it is to manage earnings by exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue on cash sales. 
If this modification is successful, then the estimate of earnings management should no longer be biased toward 
zero in samples where earnings management has taken place through the management of revenues.” 
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Therefore, the Jones model is modified taking into consideration the change in receivables 
(REC), as follows: 
 
𝑇𝐴௜௧/𝐴௜௧ିଵ  =  𝛼 ଵ  ×  [1/𝐴௜௧ିଵ]  +  𝛽ଵ௜ × [(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉௜௧  −  ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶௜௧)/ 𝐴௜௧ିଵ]  
+  𝛽௜ଶ  ×  [𝑃𝑃𝐸௜௧/𝐴௜௧ିଵ]  +  ɛ௜௧ 
 
The modification provided by Dechow et al. (1995) could not reduce the issues about Type I, 
unless it seems to suffer less from Type II errors. The models are very similar as the coefficients 
in the regression are the same except from 𝜷𝟏. So, it is straightforward that they share similar 
pros and cons, however in some circumstances one could be more appropriate than the other. 
In fact, Dechow et al. (2010) compare 5 models (Jones model (1991), modified Jones model 
(1995), DeAngelo model (1986), Healy model (1985) and Industry model of Dechow and Sloan 
(1991) ) to identify the magnitude of Type I error and also Type II. The paper is based on a 
random selections, the first one is made by 1000 firms among 168771 on Compustat, between 
1950 and 1991, the second is also about 1000 companies experienced high performances, in the 
third one the authors manipulate with a known amount of accruals 1000 firms randomly 
selected, and finally in the last sample there are 32 firms alleged by the SEC because they 
overstated earnings.  
The main results of the research are: 
 All the models are for the first selection are well specified, the incidence of Type I errors 
is close to the specified level applied; 
 In the case of the sample with high performing firms, the level of rejection for earnings 
management <0 is higher than the specified level and the modified Jones model suffers 
more the Jones model. Instead for low performing firms, the hypothesis of earning 
management>0 has the same problem just explained and even in this case the modified 
Jones model suffers more. 
 In the case of voluntary manipulation, the Jones model are biased downward than 
the modified one, in detecting earnings management; 
 In the last case the modified Jones model is more powerful in detecting earnings 
management for firms that manage revenues. And the incidence of Type II errors is 
higher for the Jones model (Dechow et al., 2010). 
Therefore, the modified Jones model seems to overcome the problem of the Jones model 
for Type II error, unless, as just shown, in some circumstance the problem for Type I is even 
marked for this model. 
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The most important issue for both models is the high correlation between accruals and 
performance, particularly when you should test discretionary accruals on sample experienced 
non-random performance (Kothari et al., 2005). Therefore, Kothari et al. (2005) focus on 
controlling accruals on firms’ performances, such as ROA. They study 94045 firm-year 
observations from Compustat between 1959 and 1998.  
They analyse residuals from Jones model, modified Jones model and an additional model where 
they add ROA to the Jones model: 
 
𝑇𝐴௜௧/𝐴௜௧ିଵ  =  𝛼 ଵ × [1/𝐴௜௧ି ]  +  𝛽ଵ௜ × [∆𝑅𝐸𝑉௜௧/ 𝐴௜௧ିଵ]  + 𝛽௜ଶ  ×  [𝑃𝑃𝐸௜௧/𝐴௜௧ିଵ]  
+ 𝛽௜ଷ  × 𝑅𝑂𝐴௜௧/𝐴௜௧ି  + ɛ௜௧ 
 
Moreover, they introduce the “performance-matched” residual, namely they find a 
firm for each company of the same industry that has the closest level of ROA and so they 
calculate the difference between the residual of the former and the latter. They compute this 
analysis at year level, three years average and five years average. The results it is a lower value 
of Type I error in their performance-matched model than the other three models. Indeed, the 
model with the ROA included increase the power of the test looking at Jones model and 
modified Jones, but it still suffers from high level of misspecification. This trend is equal in the 
estimation based on time of observation, unless the incidence of Type I error decreases with the 
increasing number of years analysed, as the Table 2 shows (Kothari et al., 2005, pp.93). 
The problem of the matching principle is to find the right benchmark for each firm, 
because if one firms achieves a specific ROA using earnings management, it would decrease 
the power of the test. To better understand the point, as reported the example by Dechow et al. 
(2010, pp. 359): 
 “For example, assume ROA is 20% for firms A and B, with firm A using 
discretionary accruals to boost its ROA by 2% to report 20%. Firm B is not manipulating 
earnings; it has achieved 20% ROA because it has higher non-discretionary accruals 
than firm A. Matching firm B to firm A would suggest that firm A’s level of non-
discretionary accruals should be the same as firm B’s, but this match is incorrect since 
the correct match should be a firm with ROA of 18%.” 
 
In conclusion, it is a right approach to identify a parameter such as ROA to better match 
for performances of companies, although scholars should bear in mind to try to be sure that the 
benchmark is the most appropriate one, because it would diminish the validity of the results and 
it would be better to use Jones model or modified Jones model. 
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Table 2: Type I and Type II error in accruals models over three and five years, from 
Kothari et al. 
 
 
Dechow and Dichev, (DD), (2002) propose another way to evaluate accruals. In that 
study the key concept is cash flow and they measure how well working capital accruals (WC) 
map into cash flow realization. Indeed, when a company book for a receivable, there could 
happen estimation error, therefore the company must correct the cash collection and they 
produce noise. These kinds of errors, if repeated, would produce lower accruals quality. 
Therefore, they create a model where change in working capital is regress on past, current and 
future cash flow from operations (CFO). 
The authors argue that the estimation error in working capital accruals could derive from 
both intentional earnings management and from the firm characteristic. However, they decide 
to not divide these two components, because they provide the same insight: low accruals 
quality, therefore there is no need to separate them (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). So, the model 
presented in their study is:  
 
ΔWC ௧ =  β଴  +   βଵ × CFO௧ିଵ +   βଶ × CFO ௧ +   βଷ × CFO௧ାଵ +  ɛ௧.  
 
The variables in question are scaled by average total assets.  
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They compute change in working capital as: ΔAR – ΔAP + ΔInventory – ΔTP + ΔOther Assets, 
namely AR is account receivables, AP is account payables, TP is tax payable. Moreover, the 
cash flow is taken from the cash flow statement required by the Accounting Standard (SFAS 
No.9, FASB 1987). 
The earnings quality measures in this case is standard deviation of residuals or also the 
absolute value of the latter. Higher the value of those measures, lower the accruals quality. 
Dechow and Dichev use a sample of 27204 firms taken from Compustat, between the years 
1987 and 1999.  
They show that changes in current working capital are positively related to future and past cash 
flow, whereas they are negatively related to current cash flow. Values of β are less than 1 due 
to the estimation errors in the independent variable (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Moreover, 
they provide a higher value of R-squared than modified Jones model (Dechow, 2010). Finally, 
they link accruals quality and firm characteristics, namely they expect that: 
 “The longer the operating cycle, the lower accrual quality.  
 The smaller the firm, the lower accrual quality. 
 The greater the magnitude of sales volatility, the lower accrual quality. 
 The greater the magnitude of cash flow volatility, the lower accrual quality. 
 The greater the magnitude of accrual volatility, the lower accrual quality. 
 The greater the magnitude of earnings volatility, the lower accrual quality. 
 The greater the frequency of reporting negative earnings, the lower accrual quality. 
 The greater the magnitude of accruals, the lower accrual quality.” (Dechow and 
Dichev, 2002, pp. 46-47). 
 
As all the previous model suffers from Type I and Type II errors and each of these do 
not capture the entirety of companies economic performances, also in this case we find some 
limitations. The first one is that the model is unsigned, and this could reduce the power of tests 
when authors would like to forecast an accounting distortion in a specific direction. However, 
the greater issue is that Dechow and Dichev consider only short-term component of accruals, 
while managers could manipulate also long-term ones, such as PPE. Not considering those 
items could lead to not capture the full picture of the company, because long-term accruals are 
important as short ones (Dechow et al., 2010).  
As for the Jones model that was enhanced with the modified version, also for the DD 
model Francis et al. (2005) propose an extension. Indeed, they follow the proposal of 
McNichols (2002) to add change in revenue to take into consideration also the performance of 
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the firm, but they also extend the regression with PPE, therefore they add also the long-term 
accruals. The model is: 
 
∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 ௧ =  𝛽଴  +   𝛽ଵ × 𝐶𝐹𝑂௧ିଵ +   𝛽ଶ × 𝐶𝐹𝑂 ௧ +   𝛽ଷ × 𝐶𝐹𝑂௧ାଵ +  𝛽ସ × ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉௧  
+  𝛽ହ × 𝑃𝑃𝐸௧  +  ɛ௧ 
 
First, the dependent variable is different than DD model, indeed there is TCA instead 
of delta in working capital. TCA, namely total current accruals, is ΔCA- ΔCL- ΔCash+ 
ΔSTDEBT, where CA is current asset, CL current liabilities and STDEBT is short-term debt.  
Moreover, they do not use the cash flow taken from the reported one, because they 
analyse a sample of 91280 firm-year observation that starts from 1970 and goes to 2001 and 
the effectiveness of SFAS No. 95 start in 1988. So, the CFO is defined as the difference between 
net income before extraordinary items and total accruals, where the latter are defined the same 
as in the Jones model. The authors apply the regression to each of the 48 industry of Fama and 
French’s (1997) and their measure of earnings quality is the standard deviation of residuals that 
comes from the average of residuals over 5 years. Also in this case a huge value for standard 
deviation indicates poorer earnings quality (Francis et al., 2005).  
The coefficients of the regressions are the same as for DD model, but now there are two 
more 𝛽. 
Furthermore, the contribution of Francis et al. (2005) does not stop here, but they 
propose a model to decompose the standard deviation of residuals into two components, i.e. the 
discretionary part, reflecting managerial choices, and the nondiscretionary one, also called 
innate component. Thus, they identify some firm characteristics in order to decompose the 
standard deviation of residuals. Those innate components that influence a firm are taken by 
Dechow and Dichev (2002), in fact they are: firm size, standard deviation of cash flow, standard 
deviation of sales, length of operating cycle and incidence of negative earnings realization 
(Francis et al., 2005). Hence, the model is: 
 
𝐴𝑄௝௧ =  𝜆଴  +  𝜆ଵ × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௝௧  +  𝜆ଶ × 𝜎(𝐶𝐹𝑂)௝௧  +  𝜆ଷ × 𝜎(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)௝௧  +  𝜆ସ × 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒௝௧  
+ 𝜆ହ × 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛௝௧  + 𝜈௝௧. 
 
Therefore, the residuals from the equation are the discretionary component of accruals 
quality, whereas the predict value of AQ are the innate part that should represent the 
fundamental performance of the firm.  
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Even though the division of residuals into the components could enhance the analysis 
of accruals models, the method should be subject to Type I error if the innate component is 
the results also of estimation errors and not only of performances. There is also room for Type 
II error, hence it should be necessary to further develop the analysis to conduct analysis as 
accurate as possible (Dechow et al., 2010). 
The final consideration about accruals model is that studies are conducted, mostly, at 
industry level rather than firm levels. Of course, it is easier to gain data at industry level, because 
with a deeper analysis at company level would impose some restriction, such as survivorship 
biases. Indeed, a broader analysis would generalize results, and this would come at cost. In fact, 
the distinction of industry is blurring nowadays and putting a firm into a group instead of 
another could produce some misspecification. Hence, residuals in the regression could be 
induced by the classification in that industry rather than the fundamental performance of the 
firm. What could be possible to do is to aggregate firm for homogenous parameter, in order to 
have homogenous classes (Dechow et al., 2005). A possible solution could be the aggregation 
for business model, even if the companies are not from the same industry, but they follow the 
same model of business. This is our approach, that will be discussed in the analysis. 
In Table 3 we report the abnormal accruals model describe in this section. 
Table 3: summary of the abnormal accruals model, from Dechow et al. 
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1.2.1.3 Earnings smoothness 
Earnings smoothness is the proxy for earnings quality in which there are different 
conclusions on the presumption that smoothing earnings is a good signal for quality or not. 
Before dealing with the problem of how to interpret the measure of smoothing, we introduce 
the models. The goal in the paper of Leuz et al. (2003) is to compare the level of earnings 
management among 31 countries, taking a sample of 70955 firm-year observation between 
1990-1999. The authors propose several measures for earnings management, among them two 
have become the reference point for future studies in earnings smoothness.  
The first one is based on the assumption that managers could manipulate earnings to cut 
off fluctuation therein, namely they work on accruals to manage accounting numbers. 
Therefore, to catch the degree of this manipulation, Leuz et al. (2003) propose to calculate the 
standard deviation of earnings to the standard deviation of cash flow from operation, because 
the latter is a good control for the specific fundamental performance of the firms. The value of 
cash flow is not taken directly from the statement of cash flow, due to the not availability of 
this for every country, hence they subtract accruals from earnings. 
The calculation of earning smoothness is:  
 
𝜎(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠௧)/ 𝜎(𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௧) 
 
Finally, the researchers state that lower value of the ratio, in the same conditions, are 
considered a signal of manipulation of accounting numbers, thus smoothing earnings.  
They also report the second method to calculate earnings smoothness. The authors start 
from the assumption that manager could manipulate how to account for economic shocks, 
namely in the case of poor performances they could delay the recognition of costs, or they can 
delay the recognition of huge revenues to have a reserve for the future. Thus, change in 
accruals affects the cash flow. There is a negative correlation between these two components 
(Dechow et al, 1994), unless the key point is that a huge value “in this correlation indicate, 
ceteris paribus, smoothing of reported earnings that does not reflect a firm’s underlying 
economic performance” (Leuz et al., 2003, pp. 510).  
The other way to calculate smoothness is:  
 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (∆𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠௧, ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௧). 
 
The paper of Leuz et al. (2003) focuses on detecting earnings management among 
countries and the external or internal factor that could lead manager to manipulate earnings, for 
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example they find that earnings management is negatively associated with legal enforcement 
and quality of minority’s rights, assuming that abnormal value of smoothness is signal of 
manipulation of earnings (Leuz et al., 2003). 
However, the two measures proposed are also the proxy for earnings quality, unless the 
literature is most focused on studying this measure in earnings management rather than earnings 
quality (Gaio and Raposo, 2001). Thus, how to interpret those figure it is ambiguous, because 
on one hand smoothing earnings is seen as the result of insider to throw away the fluctuation 
from earnings and to stabilize them, reducing volatility; on the other hand the action to smooth 
earnings could be seen as an attempt to mask the real performance of a company (Ewert and 
Wagenhofer, 2011). Therefore, it is a matter of the researcher how to evaluate this attribute 
in his/her study, taking into consideration what kind of consequences or determinants is 
analysing.  
Finally, as proposed by Dechow et al. (2010), it would be necessary to further develop 
the literature, as the case of accruals, to distinguish from normal smoothness and discretionary 
one, to provide better evidence on fundamental performances of firms and to have a better 
understanding of the results given by the models. 
 
1.2.1.4 Asymmetric timeliness and timely loss recognition 
In this section we deal with the conservatism approach, that requires to account for 
bad news faster than good ones; therefore, managers are more conservative when they have to 
assess the impact of good news rather than bad one, that is recognized promptly. This situation 
leads to a time difference between the book entry of a loss and a profit. The most used model 
is the one proposed by Basu (1997), who uses a sample of firm observation from 1963 to 1990, 
considering both data from CRSP NYSE/AMEX Monthly files and the missing accounting data 
from Compustat Annual Industrial and Research files. 
The model proposed is: 
 
𝑋௧ାଵ/𝑃௧ିଵ =  𝛼଴  +  𝛼ଵ × 𝐷𝑡 +  𝛽଴ × 𝑅𝑒𝑡 ௧ +  𝛽ଵ × 𝐷𝑡 ×  𝑅𝑒𝑡 ௧ +  ɛ௧. 
 
Where X is earnings per share for each firm in the fiscal year t, P is price per share at the 
beginning of the fiscal year t, Return (Ret) is calculated as the return of the last 9 month of year 
t and the first three months of t+1; finally D is a dummy variable where is = 0 if returns during 
the period are positive, and it is = 1 otherwise.  
The aim of this regression is to show that earnings are more sensitive to bad new than 
good one. Indeed, he shows that “the interactive slope coefficient, β1 , which measures the 
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difference in sensitivity of earnings to negative and positive returns is significant, and implies 
that earnings is about four and a half times (4.66 = [-0.216 + 0.059]/0.059) as sensitive to 
negative returns as it is to positive returns” (Basu, 1997, pp. 13).  
Basu (1997) proposes another approach not based on return to measure the timely loss 
recognition, that is: 
 
∆𝑁𝐼௧ =  𝛼଴  +  𝛼ଵ × 𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐷𝑈𝑀௧ିଵ  +  𝛼ଶ × ∆𝑁𝐼 ௧ିଵ +  𝛼ଷ × (𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐷𝑈𝑀௧ିଵ  ×  ∆𝑁𝐼௧ିଵ)  
+  ɛ௧ 
 
The dependent variables is change in net income between year t and t-1, it is possible to include 
or exclude extraordinary items, scaled by total assets at the ending of year t-1; NEGDUM is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of zero if the change in net income in t-1 is negative, and 
1 otherwise. To look at the implication of the recognition of bad or good news, we look at the 
coefficient: 
 α2=0 means that gains are “persistent” component of accounting income, in the sense 
that they are deferred until their underlying increase in cash flow are realized, thus they 
do not reverse, leading to untimely recognition; 
 α2<0 happens when there is a timely recognition, hence the component of accounting is 
“transitory” and it reverses; 
 a similar pattern of the second point, but with losses that reverse and are “transitory”, 
is when α2+ α3<0; 
 α3<0 when bad news/losses are recognized more than positive news/gains 
(Shivakumar et al., 2005). 
The problem now is to identify a measure for earnings quality from these two models. 
Indeed, the models are based on the quality of returns or on the response of good and bad news 
to specify future earnings, but they do not provide an assessment on how it is the quality of the 
earnings analysed. Moreover, those studies take into consideration sample of different countries 
or industry and this leads to a classical omitted variable problem, because there are inherent 
differences among various market and industry on how prices react to information. 
Furthermore, the model based on returns would catch all the information, without separating 
the one about earnings, because returns are based on all the information available, even non 
accounting news. Thus, also in this case there is a big issue in cross-country studies because the 
structure of the markets and the information flow are different among each state (Dechow et 
al., 2010). 
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1.2.1.5 Target beating 
We are discussing about the informativeness of accounting numbers, especially for what 
concern earnings. A lot of developments have been proposed during last decades, because of 
the low explanation power in interpret returns. Earnings are subject to transitory effects that 
diminish the validity and conclusion of the models based on them. Therefore, literature has 
evolved to distinguish the fundamental performance from those components (Hayn, 1995). 
Moreover, a story of persistent good performances, thus reporting increasing earnings is 
rewarded by stock market, with higher price-to-earnings (Barth et al., 1995). Hence, losses are 
negative from an analyst point of view and even transitory. Companies would not report 
persistent losses; it would not be reasonable to do so. Indeed, shareholders’ aim is to receive 
dividend or to get a return higher than other safer investment, otherwise they would not have 
invested in a firm. Therefore, in a negative pattern of persistent losses, they have the option to 
liquidate the firm, in order to bring back the highest possible amount of money. Shareholders 
have to compare the value from future earnings streams and the liquidation one, picking the one 
with the highest amount. For these reasons, losses should be avoided (Hayn, 1995). 
Furthermore, Hayn (1995) uses Compustat's Primary, Supplementary and Tertiary 
active and research files to analyses a group of 9752 firms, taking 85919 firm year observation 
between 1962 and 1990. He wants to analyse the change in models’ specification when he uses 
subgroups with and without losses. However, he finds a particular pattern when he studies the 
distribution of reported earnings among his group. As reported by Hayn (Hayn, 1995, pp. 132):  
“Interestingly, there is a point of discontinuity around zero. Specifically, there is 
a concentration of cases just above zero, while there are fewer than expected cases 
(assuming the above normal distribution) of small losses (i.e., just below zero). The 
frequency of observations in both the region just above and that just below zero departs 
significantly from the expected frequency under the normal distribution at the 1% 
significance level using the binomial test. These results suggest that firms whose 
earnings are expected to fall just below the zero earnings point engage in earnings 
manipulations to help them cross the "red line" for the year”. 
 
This is the starting point to discuss about target beating. Indeed, firms that would to 
avoid losses or to would like to increase earning a little bit are engaged in managing 
earnings.  
One of the most important contribution in literature in this field is provided by 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). 
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They use a sample of companies taken from Compustat between 1976 and 1994. They want to 
investigate 4 hypotheses: existence of earnings management to avoid decreases in earnings, 
prevalence of earnings management to avoid earnings decreases, existence of earnings 
management to avoid losses, prevalence of earning management to avoid losses. 
The main evidences of their study are that 8%-12% of companies that have pre-managed 
decreasing earnings manipulate those to increasing them; 30%-44% manage earnings to avoid 
losses and the major components in which they intervene are cash flow from operations and 
change in working capital (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). These two are in line with the study 
previously shown in the abnormal accruals models, as they are the two components most easily 
manipulated by managers.  
The problem behind this model regards how to use it in the field of earnings quality, as 
the literature has studied it to assess earnings management, unless there are a few contributions 
on using this for EQ. Indeed, for all the previous model their origination came from earnings 
management studies, nevertheless they were developed to be used also for earnings quality; but 
in this case there is not such pattern. The assumption in this case is to study whether there is an 
unusual clustering in earnings distribution; if yes, the firms close to the targets should have 
lower earnings quality. However, manager could meet or beat a target through different 
mechanisms, such as manipulation of accruals, tax expenses, cash flow items and other 
components; unless managing one of these leads to different responses in earnings quality, 
because it could be higher quality in the case of accruals or lower in the case of tax expenses 
(Dechow et al., 2010). Therefore, there are various method to reach o beat a target and the 
influence on earnings quality measure is not known ex-ante and the literature in this field is not 
well developed. Thus, for those reasons it is not obvious that a company close to the target have 
lower quality of earnings, also because that company could be close to the benchmark by chance 
or by fundamental performances, rather than by earnings management. Hence, it would be 
better to develop models that distinguish kink in earnings due to earnings management and 
other factors. 
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1.2.2 Investor responsiveness to earnings 
This proxy for earnings quality is based on the so-called earnings response coefficient 
ERC and the R-squared from the regression in earnings-return model. These two components 
give a measure of investor responsiveness to earnings (Dechow et al., 2010). One of the most 
important paper in this field is that of Liu and Thomas (2000) as they link ERC to earnings 
quality. The goal of their study is to determine the relation between actual unexpected returns 
and unexpected earnings that have been subject to forecast revision of future earnings. They 
state that future earnings strongly depend on information currently available and also if there 
are unexpected returns they will be reflected in future earnings. Therefore, models that do not 
consider this issue will suffer from the correlation between the omitted variable and the 
independent one. Hence, they include more variables in their regression to take into 
consideration the changes in revision of forecast and discount rate. They show that the ERC 
and R-squared are higher in the multiple regression model than the simple one.  
The model presented in the paper is based on three sources: Compustat for book values 
and earnings, Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for annual returns and for earnings 
forecast they use Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). They use a sample from 
1981 to 1994 of 6743 firm-years observations. They calculate unexpected returns (UR) as return 
of 12-months minus expected return that is risk free interest rate plus the equity premium 
multiplied by the beta5.  For what concern unexpected earnings (UE), they provide three 
measures. The first one is actual eps given by I/B/E/S minus forecast eps in the previous year 
of the present period. The second is the difference in earnings before extraordinary and 
discontinuous operations, given by Compustat. The final is the difference in actual primary 
earnings per share by I/B/E/S. Finally, they provide four revision terms (RAE2, RAE3, RAE4, 
RAE5) based on the forecasted earnings in each year and the corresponding book value at the 
beginning and also the terminal value revision (RTERM).  
The two regressions are: 
 
𝑈𝑅௧ = 𝛼଴  +  𝛼ଵ × 𝑈𝐸 ௧ + ɛ௧ 
 
𝑈𝑅௧ = 𝛽଴  + 𝛽ଵ  × 𝑈𝐸௧  +  𝛽ଶ × 𝑅𝐴𝐸2 ௧ +  𝛽ଷ × 𝑅𝐴𝐸3௧  +  𝛽ସ × 𝑅𝐴𝐸4௧  + 𝛽ହ × 𝑅𝐴𝐸5௧
+  𝛽଺ × 𝑅𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀௧ +  ɛ௧  
 
 
5 Risk free rate is the yield of Treasury bonds on 1st of April in each year, while equity risk premium is assumed 
to be 5% and beta is the median beta of all firm in the same decile as the firm analysed.  
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They test the regression of unexpected return on unexpected earnings, using the three 
definitions of UE and starting from the simple regression to a multivariable one, where they 
add the result of all the future revision in future earnings. The result is a higher R-squared in 
the model that takes into consideration the revision, as they expected to find. Moreover, 
among the three definitions of unexpected earnings, the first one described above seems to be 
slightly better than the other two, due to a higher explanatory power.  
Furthermore, they regress UR on the combined effect of all the variable of the 
multivariate equation and then decompose it, in order to see the coefficient of each part and 
because there is a possible correlation among the components that would bias the results of the 
regression. They find that they obtain a more explanatory power in the simple regression, while 
adding every time a new part produces lower explanatory power, unless it explains better the 
coefficients for each variable. Therefore, there is a trade-off between the explanatory power of 
the model and the value of coefficient that lead the model easier to be interpreted. Finally, they 
provide that both predicted ERC and R-squared are higher in the case of a strong correlation 
between the UE and revision forecast.  
We could take the value of these two as a proxy of earnings quality, as suggested by the 
authors (Liu and Thomas, 2000, pp. 73): 
 
“If high-quality earnings are expected to have large value implications, our 
results suggest that earnings quality can be measured by the observed relation between 
current-period unexpected earnings and revisions of forecasts for future-period 
earnings: a stronger relation implies higher quality”. 
 
Finally, the major problem of this model is that controls, thus revisions, are taken from 
analyst forecast. Therefore, there is no possibility to determine the result of a specific 
accounting policy and we do not have deeper research on the correlation between the forecast 
and accounting statement (Liu and Thomas, 2000). Moreover, the ERC as a proxy for quality 
cannot identify what kind of dimension we are dealing with, as persistency, earnings 
management or lower value of accruals, thus it should not be an accurate measure for EQ 
(Dechow et al., 2010). 
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1.2.3 External indicators of earnings misstatements 
So far, researchers have used the models just presented to identify measures of earnings 
quality. However, they could also take into consideration other sources to identify EQ, namely 
there are three external indicators of earnings misstatements: 
1. SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs); 
2. Restatements; 
3. Internal control procedure deficiencies reported under the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
(SOX). 
In the three cases there is an external party that identifies the misstatement, therefore 
researchers have not to struggle for choose the right model, apply it and analyse the results 
given by this one. Nevertheless, the external sources do not provide the distinction between 
a discretionary or unintentional misstatement, therefore it would bias the results of the study. 
Moreover, firms subject to AAERs or SOX could have similar characteristics that influence the 
sample taken into consideration and it could lead to misleading results (Dechow et al., 2010).  
For what concern the first indicator, AAERs, Dechow et al. (2011) provide a huge 
database of earning misstatement to be available for future researches, they analyse 2190 
AAERs, and they also calculate a F-score, a kind of red flag indicating the increasing possibility 
to detect earning misstatement. Their study is based on a sample of 676 different firms that, 
between 1982 and 2005, have reported annually or quarterly misstatement in their financial 
statements and for this reason the SEC executed enforcement action against them. As stated 
above, using an external source lead to advantages and disadvantages. Thus, Dechow et al. 
(2011) illustrate pros and cons of using AAERs. Firstly, SEC persecutes only firms in which is 
crystal clear there was a manipulation, therefore the Type I error is very low, also in 
comparison with other models, see Jones model. Nevertheless, this choice leads to a 
disadvantage, indeed, SEC has a limited budget, therefore there are some firms, that 
manipulate earnings but in a more hidden way, that are not subject to investigation, because it 
would be too much costly and the final victory by the SEC is not guaranteed. Moreover, the 
selection criteria of SEC to select which company to investigate could produce sample bias; 
unless this problem is common and widespread among other model, such as SOX, discretionary 
accruals.  
The analysis of the author is mostly concentrated on items from financial statement 
because they want to create a broader setting of analysis feasible for investor, analyst and 
auditors. They study “(i) accrual quality, (ii) financial performance, (iii) nonfinancial 
measures, (iv) off-balance sheet activities, and (v) market-based measures for identifying 
misstatements” (Dechow et al., 2011, pp. 19).  
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Among all results from their analysis, what is important to underline here is their finding 
on firms engaging in earnings manipulation. Indeed, they show an unusual high level of 
accruals quality during the years of misstatements, even in the years before the manipulation. 
Moreover, in the final section of the paper, the authors provide a model that takes into 
consideration all the five variables and try to identify which of those has the best power in 
detecting earnings misstatement. They create a model step by step, adding the variable in three 
stages. In the first one they create a model with only (i) and (ii) as variables, then in the second 
model they also consider (iii) and (iv), while in the third one they put all the variables.  
The final model gives the possibility to attribute a probability to each firm to engage in 
earnings manipulation. For example, they calculate the score for Enron and find that it has 2,76, 
that it is high than the 1 score that identify a probability of misstatements equal to the 
unconditional expectation. Then, they cluster firms, the sample is composed by the investigated 
companies and others, in 5 groups, where in the fifth there is the highest score. Therefore, they 
should expect to find the sample provided by the SEC in the highest decile.  
Hence, they estimate the Type I error and Type II, namely the first occurs when they 
treat a nonmisstating firm ad misstating one, whereas the second one is the opposite. The 
percentage for Type I error is 36,31%, while it is 31,38% for the second Type error. These 
results most probably derive from the disadvantages of the SEC sample bias, previously 
described. 
The second external indicator is restatement. Researchers has used two databases to 
collect data for firms involved in restatement, namely Nexis-Lexis Library and SEC Filing 
Library, the second is the GAO Financial Statement Restatement Database. The former was 
used by Palmrose et al. (2004) and the latter, that has been most used during last years (Dechow 
et al., 2010), by Desai et al. (2006). Thus, I briefly illustrate their study as example of how to 
use databases for analysing restatement. 
Palmrose et al. (2004) use an ample spectrum of key word to identify firms that perform 
restatement between 1995 and 1999. As stated above, they base their search on Nexis-Lexis 
Library and SEC Filing Library and they find a sample of 403 firms. Their goal is to show 
the negative stock performance after the announcement of restatement. They also examine 
the magnitude of the market reaction when restatement is due to auditor, identified by 
external party or SEC; and find that the for the first two components the negative reaction is 
more marked than for the third one. Nevertheless, they know that there are possible sample bias 
in their analysis, due to the smaller size of the studied companies than the average Compustat 
sample, and due to the reaction behaviour of the missing companies, that were identified in the 
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first estimation but the authors do not have all the necessary data for them, so they were not 
aggregated in the final sample.  
Desai et al. (2006), instead, use the GAO Financial Statement Restatement Database to 
study a sample of 477 firms involved in fraudulent or erroneous misstatements from 1997 to 
2002. Their paper is based on the behaviour of short seller to the misstatement, namely they 
show a huge trading activity for misstating firms in month before the announcement; the 
authors’ hypothesis is that short seller could anticipate the recognition of misstatement before 
the announcement and therefore they act consequently. Moreover, given the importance of 
accruals in manipulating earnings, the researchers analyse the link between those and shorting 
activity. They suggest that investors are more attractive to firms with high level of accruals 
rather than the ones with a low level.   
The advantages and disadvantages of using those databases are like the AAERs. In fact, 
the probability of Type I errors is low, but it is probable to face sample selection bias. 
Moreover, unless the databases provide ample groups of firms, the willingness to have bias is 
higher for this external indicator, because the GAO Financial Statement Restatement Database 
contains those companies that had to restate the financial statement for unintentional error. 
Finally, while for AAERs the source for the restatement is the SEC, in these case the sources 
are not only the SEC, but also the firm and the firm’s auditor; therefore is difficult to provide 
controls in order to lower the selection bias as for the AAERs (Dechow et al., 2010). 
The final indicator is internal control weakness, in particular researchers have focused 
on the consequence on this after the introduction of Sarbane Oxley regime (SOX) in 2002; 
therefore the contributions in this field deal with the post adoption of SOX, or authors compare 
period before and after the introduction. In particular, what is important in the Saraban Oxley 
Act is firstly Section 302, because it is reported that companies must provide in 10-Q2 and 10-
Ks certified conclusion about the effectiveness of their internal control procedures. Moreover, 
under section 404 companies’ management should give in annual report their opinion about the 
effectiveness of internal control procedures and structure, while before the SOX regime 
companies were obliged to give information in 8-Ks, in the case of important internal control 
deficiencies, only when they change firms’ auditors (Dechow et al., 2010). 
The importance of SOX in earnings quality literature derives from the assumption that 
with strong internal control companies should provide more reliable information in their 
financial statements, namely the willingness to produce intentional or unintentional 
misstatement should be lower with higher quality of internal control.  
Therefore, different studies (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008, Doyle et al., 2007a) examine 
the relationship between accruals quality and internal control procedures; the common vision 
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by those researches is that companies having strong internal control should have higher 
accruals quality. Nevertheless, Kim et al. (2011) underline the typical measurement problem 
of accruals, namely the models used in literature, as shown before in this paper, give 
approximations of discretionary accruals, they are not so accurate; unless, even in the 
hypothetical case of perfect measurement of accruals, there are other elements in annual report, 
for example the notes of the financial statement, that provide insight about the quality of firms’ 
information system. 
 
1.2.4 Conclusion 
In this first section are described the models used in literature that give proxies for 
earnings quality. The first one is earnings persistence, where the quality measure is the β of the 
regression, thus the forecast accuracy of current earnings for the estimation of future ones. 
Higher the value of the coefficient higher the quality, thus the β capture the persistency of 
earnings and it is better to not have transitory components that influence earnings. Then we 
also examine two development of the model, that takes into consideration more information 
about earnings, such as cash flow from operation, accruals and other parts. 
The second proxy deals with abnormal accruals and there are a lot of contribution in this 
field and a lot of models proposed. Therefore, we examine the most important and most used. 
Hence, the first one is the Jones model (1991), where total accruals are regressed on change in 
revenues and PPE. The residuals of the model are discretionary accruals and they give a 
measure of earnings quality. Unfortunately, the model suffers a lot for Type I and Type II error, 
thus Dechow et al. (1995) propose a modified version, adding change in receivable in the 
equation, namely they subtract this value from the change in revenues because Jones’ 
assumption of nondiscretionary revenues is not plausible in real world. Also in this case, 
residuals are taken as proxy for EQ. However, the model has similar problem for Type I error 
as Jones, even higher.  
Therefore Kothari et al. (2005) propose performance matched model, specifically they 
find benchmark companies looking at ROA for each company in the study. Their earnings 
quality measure is the difference between discretionary accruals of a firm and the ones of the 
target firm, previously identified with the same ROA. Nevertheless, the estimation of the right 
target lead to some misspecification, because a company could reach a predetermined level of 
performance using earnings management, therefore it could not be the right benchmark. 
Another model of abnormal accruals is the one proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002). 
In this case they work on change in working capital accruals as the dependent variable and 
they regress this on past, current and future cash flow from operation, that could be the one 
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reported in annual report or the difference between net income before extraordinary items and 
accruals. The standard deviation of residuals is the proxy for EQ, but sometimes also the 
absolute value of residuals is taken as measure. The problem of this approach is that it uses only 
short-term accruals, while managers could manipulate earnings using also long-term 
components, such as PPE. Therefore, Francis et al. (2005) add to Dichev and Dechow (2002) 
model change in revenues and PPE; moreover they study the standard deviation of residuals 
and they decompose it into innate and discretionary component.   
After abnormal accruals, we briefly introduce earnings smoothness, that is based on 
two proxy provided by Leuz et al. (2003); they calculate smoothness as standard deviation of 
earnings divided standard deviation of cash flow from operation or the correlation between 
change in accruals and change in CFO. The problem in this case is the interpretation of those 
measures, because higher level of smoothness is seen both as a good or bad signal for earnings 
quality. 
The final model is asymmetric timeliness and timely loss recognition by Basu (1997), 
who proposed to regressions to estimate the response of earnings to good and bad news, 
assuming that conservatism drives manager to account more promptly for bad news rather 
than good one. Nevertheless, the model could not give us the possibility to identify a good 
proxy for EQ because we only assess the quality of response to information but not quality 
itself. Moreover, the information is about different component, not only accounting one; thus, 
it is difficult to isolate the impact of accounting in the news. 
After that we examine target beating or meeting, that has not a model as other measures, 
whereas authors study unusual concentration of the earnings distribution around a particular 
target, most of the time around zero. The common finding is to observe firms to manage 
earnings in order to avoid losses or have an increasing bottom line, because market reward 
them for these results. Therefore, they conclude that firms close to target have lower earnings 
quality, unless they could be placed there for a lot of reasons, not only for earnings management. 
Then, it is analysed investor responsiveness to earnings. One of the most important 
contribution is from Liu and Thomas (2000) that regress unexpected return on unexpected 
earnings using a simple and multiple regression based on revision of forecast earnings. The 
measure for earnings quality is the ERC and R-squared of the model, higher the value higher 
the score. 
Finally, we present the external indicator of earnings misstatements. They are three 
model: AAERs, restatement and SOX. In these three models, researchers use external sources 
that identify misstatement, therefore they do not have to endeavour in choosing the most 
appropriate models from the one presented above, unless in both three cases they face sample 
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selection bias that diminish the quality of their results, but the analysis suffers less of Type I 
error, therefore we are in front of a trade-off problem.  
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around targets (ERC and R-squared of the model). 
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𝑈𝑅௧ = 𝛽଴  +  𝛽ଵ × 𝑈𝐸 ௧ +  ɛ௧ 
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𝑈𝑅௧ = 𝛽଴  + 𝛽ଵ  × 𝑈𝐸௧  +  𝛽ଶ × 𝑅𝐴𝐸2 ௧ +  𝛽ଷ × 𝑅𝐴𝐸3௧  + 𝛽ସ × 𝑅𝐴𝐸4௧  +
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1.2.5 New sources for earnings quality 
Earnings quality is subject to different interpretation and thus various model that focus 
on different features of companies, such as accruals, earnings, meeting target, and also there 
are external factors that indicate the level of quality. All these models are presented and studied  
in literature, however as the necessity of information about companies is increasing, indeed 
we know that in perfect market the information available to all participant would be equal 
(Fama, 1965), so no one would gain, there are software that provide lots of tools to analyse 
firms in their entirety, in order to give to investor all the possible news to evaluate better the 
performance and stock prices of companies.  
Among all the offer, Eikon is one of the biggest financial data providers, its market 
share is close to 21,1%6. In fact, it is possible to find also the StarMine model for earnings 
quality, thus a new method to estimate EQ.  
The model proposed by Eikon does not refer to the ones presented in literature and also 
scholars have not used yet the score presented in the software. Therefore, the first question of 
the analysis is how the metric presented by StarMine is correlated with the classical earnings 
quality measures and the second one is how strong the explanatory power of the components 
of each score on Eikon metric is. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6http://www.google.com/amp/s/ubesblog.wordpress.com/2019/06/23/Bloomberg-e-i-top-global-financial-data-
providers/amp/  
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1.3 Determinants and consequences of earnings quality 
As stated in the introduction, Dechow et al. (2010) give a criterion to divide papers 
dealing with earning quality. Indeed, they decompose literature into two groups, namely 
determinants and consequences of EQ. In fact, in the first layer earnings quality is the 
dependent variable of the study, while in the second it is the independent variable. They propose 
such division to study whether the different proxies provide the same result when they are 
applied for the same consequences or the same determinants. This approach is important 
because it is common that scholars use a mix of proxies in their papers, unless it is not proven 
that a measure made of multiple proxies is better than one or viceversa (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 
2011). Thus, it is possible to identify arguments in which the different proxies could behave in 
the same way or they could give mix evidence; so that the scholars could be aware when a 
combination of proxies could be better or to choose one of those.  
Therefore, in the next paragraph, firstly we identify the most studied determinants and 
consequences in literature, and we analyse the behaviour of the different proxies for each of 
these. 
 
1.3.1 Determinants of earnings quality 
Dechow et al. (2010) analyse more than 300 papers on earnings quality. They identify 
six categories of determinants: firm characteristics, financial reporting practices, 
governance and controls, auditors, equity market incentives, and external factors. What 
we propose is to study, if possible, how the proxies identified in the previous section, work in 
each of the categories; whether they provide the same conclusions or not (Dechow et al., 2010).                                                                
 
1.3.1.1 Firm characteristic  
Scholars analyse a lot of firm characteristics; however it is possible to focus on the most 
important:  
 Firm performance: this feature mostly focuses on firm showing poor performances; 
indeed, scholars identify that these companies are keener on managing earnings. Inside 
this field of research, EQ proxies seem to behave in the same direction. Starting from 
abnormal accruals model, we identify lot of papers (e.g. DeAngelo, 1988, Healy, 1985, 
Guay et al., 1996) that provide evidence of how poor performing companies manipulate 
earnings to hide their bad status. Moreover, in the case of low accruals quality we face also 
low earnings persistence (Dechow and Dichev, 2002), therefore it could be said that, even 
for this proxy, the quality of the score is lower in case of poor performances. Nevertheless, 
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it is worthy to briefly analyse the relationship of accruals and earnings persistence. Indeed, 
as stated above, the final result for firms performances of both two metrics mostly goes in 
the same direction. However, this evidence does not provide an insight of the accruals 
components of earnings persistence (see the equation in section 1.2.1). Sloan (1996) shows 
that cash flows is more persistent than accruals. This means that in the final score for 
earnings quality, CF gives the biggest contribution for earnings persistence; thus it is 
difficult to decompose the level of accruals from its quality value (Dechow and Dichev, 
2002). Despite this problem, Dechow et al. (2010) state that earnings are more stable and 
more persistent than cash flows, therefore the component of accruals in the valuation of 
earnings persistency is fundamental for enhancing the decision usefulness, even if the 
accruals quality is low. Moreover, scholars have been studying what type of accruals are 
more persistent than others, e.g. inventory or receivables (see Lev and Thiagarajan, 1993, 
Abarbanell and Bushee, 1997). One important finding is from Richardson et al. (2005) who 
provide evidence of more persistent long-term accruals than short term and the same for 
financial accruals in comparison with of operating ones. 
After this brief explanation, we continue with the other proxies. For what concerns 
smoothness, Defond and Park (1997) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) show that firms 
engaging in poor performance have an incentive to smooth earnings and to bring to the 
present the benefit of future better performances, therefore they are more active in 
smoothing earnings than firm with better results. Thus, also in this case we find that this 
proxy is in line with the others. 
In the field of target beating, as examined in the previous section, that companies 
with poor performances would like to avoid losses or try to gain increasing income from 
one year to the following one (Hayn, 1995). However, the problem of this proxy is to 
identify companies that are close to the target for fundamental performance or for earnings 
management. 
Finally, for external indicators of earnings misstatements, taking into consideration 
only the case where the misstatements are due to intentional management’s behaviours, we 
could conclude that managers deliberately manipulate earnings in cases of poor 
performances, thus also this proxy gives results similar to the previous ones. Moreover, Li 
(2008) shows that companies showing bad results present annual report that are more 
difficult to read and understand. Furthermore, even if they do not study misstatement, the 
fact of creating difficult report could be seen as a presumption of future restatement. Li also 
gives evidence of a positive relation between low earnings persistence and “foggy” report. 
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 Debt: the key point for this determinant is the increasing probability for manager to 
manipulate earnings when the debt to equity ratio is very high or when the company is 
close to breach debt covenants (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Therefore, the possible 
manipulation can diminish and affect the quality of earnings, taking into consideration the 
various proxies for EQ. In this regard, Ghosh and Moon (2010) study the trend between 
debt level and accruals quality, using Dechow and Dichev approach (2002) and its 
development from McNichols (2002) and Francis (2005). They find a positive relationship 
when level of debt is low, because company are more prone to disclose qualitative 
information to creditors, while the fear for breaching debt covenant in the case of huge 
level of leverage makes manager to manipulate earnings. For what concerns earnings 
smoothness, Gassen and Fülbier (2015) analyse more than 700,000 companies among 24 
European Countries to investigate the pattern between credit financing and earnings 
smoothness, focusing on how specific features of those private companies could influence 
the contracting between them and creditors, but also the influence of  the country-level debt 
infrastructure. Among all their findings, we report the one important for our analysis, 
namely they find that firms with high level of debt show huge level of earnings 
smoothness, in particular trade credit are most sensitive to smoothness because this type of 
creditors is less able to monitor and negotiate the debt. Moreover, they are more exposed to 
firm’s performance due to their function of providing input for the production phase. Of 
course, the typical problem of earnings smoothness is whether a high level is desirable or 
not; in this case we could state that, as for accruals, managers engages in manipulating the 
component of earnings to reduce the cost of debt, thus the level of variability of net income 
is higher and so the ratio. Therefore, high value of smoothness is a bad signal, as for 
accruals. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the Nikolaev’s paper (2010), he studies 
the relation between debt covenants and timeliness loss recognition, and he finds that 
companies with high value of the former demand more promptly recognition of losses, thus 
higher the EQ value for this proxy. Bearing in mind all the problems of this metric to 
measure earning quality, we conclude that this one is in contrast with the other measures. 
Indeed, also in the case of restatement (Efendi et al., 2007) and AAERs (Dechow et al., 
2011) high level of leverage is associated with lower EQ.  
 Other components commonly analysed by scholars are firms’ growth and investment. 
Starting with accruals, we identify that companies, facing new investment for growth, show 
high level of accruals. However, those are made of discretionary and nondiscretionary 
parts. Therefore, if we think that the normal accruals are the result of companies’ decision, 
the abnormal should not be connected with growth (Allen et al., 2013). Nevertheless, as 
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shown in previous section, the ability of current model to decompose accurately accruals is 
low. However, for the other proxies we identify a negative pattern between growth and 
quality. For what concerns persistence several studies (Nissim and Penman, 2001; Penman 
and Zhang, 2002) provide evidence of this negative trend between EQ and growth. 
Moreover, Allen et al. (2013) show that the “good” part of accruals is positively related 
with increasing investment of companies, unless it is less persistent than cash flow, as 
previously describe by Sloan (1996). Hence, in a context of fixed value of CF, the accruals 
part would diminish more the persistence of earnings in the case of a pattern of sales growth. 
Finally, also in the case of target beating (McVay et al., 2006), internal control weaknesses 
(Doyle et al., 2007b) and AAERs (Dechow et al., 2011) scholars suggest the same results. 
Only for restatement, Lee et al. (2006) cannot arrive to the same conclusion of negative 
relation between firm’s growth and restated amounts.  
 The final feature is firm size. This one is the most controversial aspects because conclusion 
on the relation between size and EQ is mixed. Indeed, a part of literature, especially the 
older one (Dechow et al., 2010), supports the hypothesis that big companies do not 
attempt to smooth or manage earnings, because they are subject to more control and 
restriction than smaller firms and they bring attention to other parties, such as investor or 
analyst, so a lot of external party are involved in controlling their report (Albrecth and 
Richardson, 1990, Lee and Choi, 2002). Therefore, they have less room to manipulate 
annual report due to the higher probability to be discovered. However, starting from Moses 
(1987), scholars provide evidence of the opposite, indeed they state that larger firms have 
more incentive to smooth or manage earnings. Moreover, bigger companies spend a lot of 
money to maintain adequate internal control procedure, therefore this is positively 
associated with earnings quality (Doyle et al., 2007a, Ball and Foster, 1982).                                              
These are the most common firms characteristic analysed in literature and we briefly 
identify whether the different proxies provide the same evidence or not. However, what is 
important to underline is the link between these four features and accounting choice/method, 
indeed most of the papers base their analysis on this relation. In fact, when a researcher uses an 
accounting choice, e.g. inventory, as a determinant for earnings management or EQ to identify 
in his/her sample companies that are involved in manipulating earnings, he/she must control for 
fundamental performances prior to conduct the analysis. This previous step is necessary 
because the result of the analysis could be biased if he/she does not do so, due to the possible 
influence of innate performance on accounting choice/method (Dechow et al., 2010). 
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1.3.1.2 Financial reporting practices 
The consequence of the conclusion of the last paragraph is to study how financial 
reporting practices affect EQ, whether possible. Indeed, the contribution in this field is not as 
developed as for firms’ characteristics, because scholars find lot of issues when they analyse 
this subject. In fact, the accounting standard gives manager the possibility to use their 
judgement to determine some financial items, e.g.  inventory using LIFO/FIFO. Therefore, it 
is difficult to assess whether the choice is made for opportunism or for providing better 
information to external parties. Indeed, managers do not want to be detected when they 
manipulate accounting number for their personal purposes. Moreover, in the case of using 
mandatory rules it is impossible study cross-sectional variation, the only thing to compare is 
variation among different country that adopt the same rules, unless this creates the classical 
omitted variable problem (Dechow et al., 2010). However, despite these problems, there is a 
common sense that accounting choices are mostly taken for opportunistic reasons and so 
the EQ is lower among all the proxies. Furthermore, to support this hypothesis, some authors 
find the quality of earnings is increasing in the case of conservative choices by the management 
(LaFond and Watts, 2008, Ball and Shivakumar, 2008, Ciftci, 2010), taking into consideration 
that conservatism and manipulation of earnings are at odds.  
Instead, scholars have examined the differences in interim annual reports. In this case 
there is more room to detect management’s misconduct, because an external party could expect 
to not find differences among quarterly report, except ones derived for fundamental 
performances of a firms, e.g. products seasonality. Kerstein and Rai (2007) start from the 
hypothesis of Hayn (1995) that companies with small losses have more incentives to manage 
earnings to report a small profit, hence this explains the kink around zero earnings. However, 
the two authors argue on the limitation of his analysis, that is he does not focus on the 
distribution pre manipulation. Therefore, they propose to study annual earnings during the 
entire year, and they document that firms, that have small aggregate losses in the first three 
quarterly report, have more possibility to manage earning in the last quarter to report small 
profits. Moreover, they suggest that companies with losses close to zero have lower costs of 
earning management than firms with positive earnings, because the probability to be discovered 
is lower. Thus, they propose that firms always compare cost and benefit of manipulation, 
before applying it.  
Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) provide a similar evidence. They study the distribution of 
earnings in the first three quarters and then they compare it with the one at fiscal year ended. 
The evidence is a kink around zero in the distribution of annual earnings, suggesting higher 
earnings management in the last quarter. Moreover, they also provide evidence that this 
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manipulation is not only for firms around zero, but also for companies that would to meet a 
benchmark. Also McVay (2006) finds that managers use discretion over some expenses 
classification to report them in categories seen less persistent by analyst, in order to meet their 
forecast, thus not only around zero earnings.  
Nevertheless, Brown and Pinello (2007) find that managers have less possibility to avoid 
negative earnings surprise or manging upwards earnings at the end of the fiscal year. Indeed, 
interim reports are not audited therefore managers have more room to decide how to allocate 
some expenses or some categories; they have less restriction than at the end of the period.  
 
1.3.1.3 Governance and controls 
This section about governance and internal control takes into consideration different 
kind of mechanisms, namely the ones that better describe the principal-agent problem in a firm 
(Dechow et al., 2010). The first to analyse is internal control procedures, that is analysed with 
a deeper analysis in the section 1.2.3. Indeed, papers dealing with this mechanism show that 
strong internal control procedures are always associated with high EQ and lower possibility 
to manage earnings (Doyle et al., 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008). Therefore, in this case 
EQ proxies provide same evidences. Nevertheless, other types of mechanisms behave in the 
opposite way, in fact the various proxies suggest mixed evidences. For what concerns 
characteristic of board of directors (BOD), scholars focus on the relation between EQ and the 
BOD composition, namely the incidence on total of external and independent members and the 
influence of audit committee. Farber (2005) analyses a sample of 87 firms detected by SEC for 
committing fraud and he uses AAERs as proxies for his research. He provides evidence that 
this group of companies have higher number of insider member of BOD, less meeting with 
audit committee. These results are also shown by Beasley (1996) and other authors, using 
different features of BOD to analyse fraud pattern, e.g. board turn over (Agrawal et al., 1999). 
Despite those contributions, Peasnell et al. (2005) find similar conclusion in the relation 
between number of external member and the likelihood to manipulate earnings. They use 
discretionary accruals as proxy of EQ. Nevertheless, their conclusion is in line with the previous 
only in the case of avoiding losses, indeed when they study situation of income-decreasing, 
there are various reason for managers to diminish the value of net income, they do not provide 
the same results as the case of income-increasing. Moreover, when they analyse with these 
metrics the role of audit committee, there is no evidence that characteristics of this one is 
associated with higher or lower probability to manage earnings in order to meet or beat 
threshold. In addition to this, Larcker et al. (2007) examine 14 features of corporate governance 
and they use all the proxies for EQ to analyse how they behave for each of those dimensions. 
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The results found are mixed in term of response for the 14 characteristics in the same EQ 
proxy, but also the latter have different conclusions for the same dimensions. Hence, he states 
(Larcker et al., 2007, p. 989): “Consistent with the results in Table 5, there is very mixed 
evidence that our governance factors explain variation across numerous measures of financial 
reporting quality”. 
Furthermore, there is even more confusion in the papers that compare the ownership 
structure and EQ. Indeed, in literature there are two effects driving this feature: the 
entrenchment effect and the alignment one. The former indicates the behaviour of owners to 
extract compensation from the firm for private benefits and this comes at cost for minorities, 
whereas the latter is the demand to share the same interest between family members and other 
shareholders. Scholars, using different proxies of EQ in their analysis, provide mixed evidences 
within these two effects. Starting with the entrenchment, Fan and Wong (2002) use ERC to 
demonstrate how the higher the ownership concentration the lower the quality of earnings for 
firms, unless they limit the study for family-owned companies based in East Asian countries. 
Therefore, it is not possible to extend this result for other countries due to the uniqueness of the 
region. However, Francis et al. (2005) finds that in United States dual class companies are less 
transparent than one class, namely the former show more concentration than the latter, thus 
Wang (2006) conclude that is a point in favour of the entrenchment effect for family companies. 
Although these two studies, Wang (2006) states that external users of financial statement, 
bearing in mind the possibility of opaqueness of report in family business, demand more quality 
than non-family firms. Therefore, for contracting purposes, such as lowering cost of capital, 
family firms would issue annual report more transparent and produce more EQ.  
For the second hypothesis, studies based on ERC and discretionary accruals (Warfield 
et al., 1995, Gul et al., 2003) support the hypothesis that family members are more interested 
in long-term performances and more able to monitor employees and to create a trustful 
relationship with them (Weber et al., 2003). Thus, the incentive to manage earnings is lower 
than non-family firms. But, the evidence of strong corporate governance in these firms could 
also allow to report low earnings quality. Indeed Wang (2006, pp. 627) states:  
“Shareholders may rely less on public financial information to monitor managers 
if the interests of insiders and outsiders are better aligned. As such, shareholders of 
family firms may have less incentive to demand high-quality financial information 
because family member managers, who may also be influential shareholders, have 
access to family firms’ private information. Similar arguments can be made for 
creditors. If creditors believe that family ownership is associated with stronger corporate 
governance, the debt contracting terms for family firms will be less sensitive to earnings 
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quality because creditors may assume that financial statements of family firms are 
prepared in good faith. Overall, the alignment effect implies that family ownership 
reduces the demand for quality financial reporting”. 
Overall, governance and controls create a lot of mixed evidences, therefore studying the 
differences among proxies would be useless due to the possibility to find discrepancies within 
the same metric. 
 
1.3.1.4 Auditors 
Auditors are taken as determinants for earnings quality due to their role of detecting 
intentional or unintentional misstatements. Thus, scholars try to study what elements affect 
their ability to find and correct misstated report. However, the probability of detecting such 
errors is based mostly on auditors’ efforts and incentives, unless they are not observable 
(Dechow et al., 2010). Nelson et al. (2002) investigate the conduct of managers and auditors in 
case of earnings management, namely in what areas and situations the formers have the 
incentives to manipulate earnings and the relatively auditors’ responses. They interview 253 
audit partners, who were involved in 515 earning management actions. The overall results are: 
44% of attempts are adjusted from auditors, 21% was considered in line with GAAP, in 17% 
of cases auditors was not so secure of misstatements thus they do not provide corrections, the 
remaining 18% is considered not material. Moreover, they state that: 
“when transaction structuring is involved, managers are more likely to make 
attempts (and auditors are less likely to adjust attempts) that are governed by precise 
standards, and when transaction structuring is not involved, managers are more likely 
to make attempts (and auditors are less likely to adjust attempts) that are governed by 
imprecise standards. Managers tend to make attempts that increase current-year income, 
but auditors are more likely to adjust these attempts. Managers are more likely to make 
attempts that decrease current-year income when standards are imprecise and/or with 
unstructured trans- actions. Auditors are more likely to adjust attempts they consider 
material and attempts made by small clients”. 
The relation between auditors and EQ depends on factors not directly measurable, as 
stated before, such as efforts and incentives. Of course, the higher the auditors put themselves 
in the work the higher the probability to detect misstatement and produce high quality report. 
Unfortunately, the attempt could be measured as hours spent in auditing the firm or the auditors’ 
expertise, unless these elements indirectly produce a measure of effort that could not be the 
true one, e.g. more hours dedicated does not mean a better job than less hours.  
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The feature mostly analysed is auditors’ tenure, to analyse the duration with earnings 
quality. Going beyond the association of this with a specific proxy, the results, even for the 
same metric, are mixed. Indeed, scholars provide evidences that long tenure is associated with 
declining earnings quality and they suggest that it would be better for firms to change more 
times auditors on the other side (Chi and Huang, 2005); other authors show that EQ increase 
with the increasing years of tenure, because auditors will increase their knowledge of the firm 
and would be more able to detect more misconduct (e.g. Chen et al., 2008, Johnson et al., 2002). 
In the majority of papers, the proxy used is discretionary accruals, however Myers et al. 
(2004) use restatement to verify whether or not the probability to find restated report increases 
with the tenure; their conclusion is that it decreases. While Ghosh and Moon (2005) use ERC 
and they provide evidence of a positive relation between this proxy and audit tenure.   
Finally, another feature analysed by researchers is auditor size, namely they concentrate 
on Big 6 firms and mostly the provide evidence that discretionary accruals are lower in value 
in the case of companies audited by these big auditors. However, there are mixed conclusions 
when scholars use in their study the type of fees (Dechow et al., 2010). 
 
1.3.1.5 Capital market incentives  
Capital market is key during companies life. Indeed, it provides various sources of 
financing, a lot of figures (e.g. investors, analyst, hedge funds, rating agencies etc..) are 
involved and they analyse firms performances, evaluating the soundness of them, whether to 
invest or not. Therefore, because capital market incentives derive from different layers of 
institutions, people, the likelihood that companies manipulate earnings and choose ad hoc 
accounting method is high. Hence, capital market provides a lot of incentives for managers 
to manage earnings, depending on the situation and time life of the company.  
It is possible to divide two classes of incentives within the context of capital markets. 
The first one is when companies have to raise money. The first step in the capital market for a 
company is the IPO. This is a crucial phase because it represents the transition from private 
company to public one, taking within all the consequence of this change, namely the most 
important is the disclosure of information, as there are big differences in this term between pre 
and post IPO. Therefore, this transaction could provide a lot of incentives for earnings 
management, unless the increasing quality, required by users of companies report, could 
enhance the information provided by the firm, hence the EQ. Thus, there are two streams of 
thinking about how IPO could influence positively or negatively earnings quality. Teoh et al. 
(1998) provide evidences that current discretionary accruals are higher in the period close of 
the IPO for firms going public than the private one. Moreover, they show the negative relation 
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between high accruals and stock performances. Thus, we could conclude that IPO is a process 
that could produce lower EQ. However, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) demonstrate the opposite 
case, indeed they conclude that companies close to IPO have higher EQ, namely lower accruals. 
They support the hypothesis that firms should report more qualitative information close to IPO. 
They provide explanation against Teoh et al. (1998), specifically they compare pre and post 
IPO annual report and they find that restatements occur in years prior to IPO, but less in the 
year before; moreover, those restatements provide more conservative report; thus they do not 
find evidence of earnings management. Furthermore, they compare companies going public 
with private one, showing that the accruals are more conservative for the formers. Therefore, 
they conclude that: “estimating ‘‘discretionary’’ accruals around the time of IPOs requires 
careful controls for the accruals resulting from substantial pre-IPO growth and from the use of 
IPO proceeds to alter working capital”.  
Nevertheless, studying IPO leads to two problems. The first one is the impossibility to 
conduct researches among different countries, due to the classical omitted variable problem 
(Ball and Shivakumar, 2008). The second is that IPO is one shot event that could produce 
consequences for a long time, therefore scholars should take into consideration in their papers 
also these long-time effects, unless they focus only in period close to this transaction (Dechow 
et al., 2010). 
Of course, there are other situations and motivations for companies to raise money 
during their life. Literature is not so developed and as we have just showed, scholars 
concentrate on accruals quality, therefore other proxies are not taken into consideration in their 
studies. Nevertheless, some researchers use AAERs and restatement as metric to demonstrate 
that companies raising money are more prone to manipulate earnings (Efendi et al., 2007, 
Dechow et al., 2011). 
Other than raising money, companies give lot of credits to analysts’ forecast; therefore, 
they strive to meet or beat benchmarks. The actions pursued by companies to follow market 
expectation are associated with earnings management and then EQ proxies in their entirety are 
lower. But, Barton and Simko (2002) provide evidence that there could be constraint for 
companies that restrict the possibility to manage earning in order to meet forecast expectation. 
They focus on the level of net assets, that is associated with earnings management actions. This 
value is a consequence of companies previous choices, thus if in past year firms were involved 
a lot to manipulate earnings, in present it would be more difficult to replicate this behaviour, 
then meeting ore beating a benchmark would be less realizable. Moreover, companies that 
follow analysts’ expectation are driven by what analysts do, thus there are cases that meeting 
or beating targets derive from these external actors. Therefore, Dechow et al. (2010) conclude 
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that, despite the great evidence of lower EQ values in this specific determinant, scholars should 
bear in mind this final issue. In addition to this, they state that scholars do not provide evidence 
on why companies decide to choose that particular accounting choice in meeting or beating 
target. They only describe earnings management, but a deeper analysis on the motivation behind 
the choice would be better to describe this matter.  
 
1.3.1.6 External factors 
The final group of determinants is external factors, such as capital requirements, tax 
regulations, political influences, that could affect accounting choices (Dechow et al., 2010). 
For what concerns capital requirements, scholars have been focusing on banking industry, 
namely they use loan loss provision (LLP) as the most important accruals used to achieve 
financial stability. Moreover, the importance of LLP nowadays for countries adopting IFRS is 
even more pronounced than in the past, because IFRS 9 has brought new accounting treatments 
for loans, e.g. impairment and the definition of three stages. Thus, even if scholars (see Leventis 
et al., 2010, Barth et al., 2008) provide evidences that the adoption of IFRS leads to more 
transparent information in annual report and less room for earnings management, authors 
should now concentrate on the effect of this new standard. However, what is generally accepted 
and demonstrated is that LLP is used for manipulating earnings, hence lowering earnings 
quality (Dechow et al., 2010). Nevertheless, this conclusion could not be transferred to other 
industries, due to the specific and unique feature of banking sector. In addition, there is a direct 
link between LLP and capital requirements, given more possibilities for scholars to concentrate 
on this to detect earnings management with more powerful tests (Dechow et al., 2010).  
The other factor is taxation. It is well-known that companies endeavour to reduce their 
taxable income. However, there could be that tax choices would go in contrast with accounting 
ones. Therefore, managers face trade-off between increasing accounting income or decreasing 
taxable income (Erickson et al., 2004). One of the most studied examples of this is the adoption 
of LIFO instead of FIFO and the tax consequences. Scholars (see for example Davis et al., 1984, 
Abdel-khalik, 1985, Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001) show that some companies decide to bear 
tax costs in order to increase accounting earnings. Unfortunately, the relationship between this 
tax choices and EQ is limited, therefore we could not provide any conclusion on this. 
Finally, the last external factor is SOX. As Dechow et al. (2010, pp. 385) state:  
“Preliminary evidence suggests that earnings management activities using 
accruals declines following SOX, but that firms substitute other mechanisms such as 
real earnings management activities and ‘‘expectations management’’ (Cohen et 
al.,2008; Koh et al.,2008). Thus, the overall effect of SOX on the decision usefulness of 
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earnings is ambiguous… accruals management, ceteris paribus, may impair earnings 
quality, but it represents only one choice within the firm’s portfolio of financial 
reporting choices.” 
1.3.1.7 New determinants 
The determinants just analysed are grouped into six categories: firm characteristics, 
financial reporting practices, governance and controls, auditors, equity market incentives, and 
external factors. In particular, we focus on firm characteristics and financial reporting 
practices.  
Indeed, the second goal of this study is to examine three determinants, namely business 
model, accounting principle of inventory and the choice to cover or not the commodities 
risk. The choice of these three features derives from the peculiarity of the industry chosen in 
the analysis, the food processing. Indeed, it is important to divide companies not looking at 
what kind of product they produce or sectors they belong, but to assess the business model 
chosen at the beginning. In fact, there could be a lot of differences between two firms that 
process, for example, vegetables but one decides to concentrate only on frozen products and 
the other on fresh ones. Therefore, we bring a new determinant under the firm characteristics, 
that is business model. This is extremely important as the industries are not demarked as in the 
last decades, and because it is a more appropriate principle to distribute firms, because the 
choice of how to run a business impact the company in its entirety. Moreover, it is a subject not 
so developed in literature, so it could be a starting point for future analysis. So, the first question 
is to see whether the choice of a business model instead of the other lead to higher EQ. 
For what concerns accounting treatment, this determinant goes under the group of 
financial reporting practices. Furthermore, it is not an innovation in this field, as the choice 
between FIFO vs LIFO is presented in other papers. However, dealing with food processing 
firms, where management inventory is crucial to not waste products and to maximizes it, the 
accounting methods of inventory has more peculiarity than for other industries. Moreover, 
under U.S GAAP there is the possibility to apply also LIFO, which is not suitable under IFRS. 
Then, the second question is to assess whether choosing FIFO could produce more earnings 
quality or not. 
Finally, linked to inventory, there is commodity risk, as companies in food processing 
buy products quoted in the market, so subject to fluctuation. Therefore, it is interesting and also 
innovative to analyse whether covering risk with derivatives could determine more or lower 
EQ. Even in this case, this is a peculiarity of the industry. 
In conclusion, there are six groups of determinants, however not everyone has the same 
important as other, so we decide to investigate the ones more appropriate for food processing. 
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1.3.2 Consequences of earnings quality 
In this section earnings quality is the independent variable and, as for the determinants, 
we provide whether the same consequence leads to the same results across the different proxies.  
One of the most studied consequence is return, namely authors attempt to link this 
one with earnings persistence. Therefore, the analysis of this consequence is limited to only 
one proxy. However, trying to explain returns in the market is crucial for investors, firms, 
analysts and also scholars; thus it is important to discuss about it, even if literature have 
examined only the relationship with return on this metric. 
The first contribution is the Sloan’s paper (1996) who analyses how stock prices are 
influenced by accruals component and cash flow component of earnings and the ability of these 
two to predict future earnings, namely their persistency. He shows that investors are not fully 
aware of the different persistence between accruals and CF.  Moreover, he provides 
evidence about this investors’ inability, namely he shows the so-called accruals anomaly that 
is the hedging strategy to be long on firms with low accruals and short with high accruals firms. 
This portfolio leads to abnormal returns close to 12% per annum. This finding brings other 
authors to explain the reason behind this phenomenon. Xie (2001) studies the different 
persistence of normal and abnormal accruals, indeed he performs the Mishkin (1983) test and 
the hedge-portfolio test. He finds out that the abnormal accruals in both test result to be 
mispriced by the market, precisely they are overpriced. Therefore, he attributes the accrual 
anomaly to this component. Conversely, Richardson et al. (2005) focus on reliability of 
accruals. They provide evidence that lower level of reliability in accruals are associated with 
less persistency. Moreover, they explain that investors are not aware of the lower persistency 
of less reliable accruals, thus abnormal returns in Sloan (1996) are explained by this inability. 
Desai et al. (2004) try to give a third explanation of this anomaly. They study not only the 
accrual one but also the so-called value glamour, that is the behaviour of investor to have 
higher expectation for firms showing strong fundamental, namely low past sales growth, high 
book-to-market ratio, high earnings-to-price and cash-to-price, than  for companies 
showing the opposite pattern. Desai et al. find a positive relation with these components and 
the ones for accruals anomaly, e.g. the positive relation between sales growth and accruals, 
thus they analyse the two phenomena at the same time. They provide evidence that investors 
do not capture how growth is reflected in accruals, thus this is one of the reasons behind the 
accruals anomaly. Finally, Khan (2008) focuses on the models used in previous literature to 
determine the phenomenon. Therefore, he uses a four factors models and he shows that is better 
than the models used by previous scholars because it has an aggregate error close to zero, while 
the other are statistically significant from it, i.e. the CAPM, the Campbell–Vuolteenaho two-
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factor model, the Fama–French three-factor model and the Vassalou and Xing (2004) model. 
Using its model, he finds that the anomaly between low accruals firms and high accruals is 
due to risk premium. Thus, the accruals anomaly is the results of research design. 
The topic of accruals and persistence has been developed with deeper analyses that 
disaggregate the former into various components, such as write-off or industry-specific accruals 
(Dechow et al., 2010). However, we would not examine all these studies because they rely on 
the only proxy of persistence and it is beyond the aim of this section.    
Therefore, there are several consequences studied in literature, some of them are also 
determinants, so it is important to fully understand the causality when authors perform an 
analysis on those topics. Dechow et al. (2010) identify nine different consequences: litigation 
propensity, audit opinions, market valuations, real activities, executive compensation, 
labor market outcomes, firm’s cost of equity capital, firm’s cost of debt, analyst forecast 
accuracy.  
1.3.2.1 Litigation propensity 
Litigation propensity as consequences in EQ is limited only in two proxies: restatement 
and abnormal accruals (Dechow et al., 2010). For the first metric, Palmrose et al. (2004) focus 
on the effect of restatement that affects historical earnings, therefore they do not concentrate 
only in period close to the announcement of restatement, as mostly scholars do, but they analyse 
the consequences for investors to change past numbers. Taking the same perspective, Lev 
et al. (2008) provide evidence that restatement that affect the historical pattern of earnings 
increases the likelihood to have litigation.   
For what concerns abnormal accruals, authors concentrate on events with high risk 
of misstatement, such as pre-merger, IPO or SEO, where managers have the incentive to inflate 
income or to meet benchmark in order to increase their final compensation. In such cases, they 
find that higher value of abnormal accruals, hence lower EQ, are strongly associated with 
lawsuits (Gong et al., 2008, Ducharme et al., 2004). Therefore, these two proxies give the same 
insight on litigation propensity, unless there are not studies that provide evidence using other 
proxies to corroborate this conclusion (Dechow et al., 2010).  
1.3.2.2 Audit opinions 
For audit opinion scholars have concentrated only on abnormal accruals proxies. This 
is due to the impossibility to link the other metric with this pattern. Indeed, auditors’ job is to 
challenge whether financial statement are correct under GAAP, thus using proxy such as 
earnings persistence or earnings meeting could not be meaningful to describe their attitude, 
because it would be time difficult to link a poor metric with financial statement that could be 
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attempt by auditor. Whereas, in case of abnormal accruals, that involved directly items of 
annual report, is straightforward to study if they could lead to audit opinions. Hence, there is 
mixed evidence about this proxy. In fact, Francis and Krishnan (1999) state that high accruals 
firms have more possibility to receive a qualified opinion. On contrary, Butler et al. (2004) 
support this hypothesis, unless when they add for control, such as distress situation, they change 
their mind. Therefore, it is important to take into consideration the life cycle of a company 
when analysing its accruals level, because high level could derive from this instead of earning 
management (Butler et al., 2004). Finally, Bradshaw et al. (2001) argue that auditors could not 
judge the quality of earnings or give opinion about it, they only concentrate on GAAP 
violations.  
1.3.2.3 Market valuations 
Valuations usually are based on numbers provided by companies in their annual or 
interim report, and they also take into consideration other elements that could be external, e.g. 
market future growth rate, country risk, but also other firms specific feature as possible lawsuits, 
launching of new products and so on. However, the major drivers derive from financial 
statement, in particular EPS are extremely important. Therefore, Myers et al. (2007) provide 
evidence that companies with a strong pattern of increasing EPS are rewarded by market 
with higher stock prices. Nevertheless, they strive to report slightly higher earnings from one 
period to the other, because when the pattern of growth stop, the losses incurred are huge. 
Hence, those companies manage earnings or smooth them in order to continue to be 
recognized by investors. Moreover, also meeting or beating target lead to received high 
recommendation by the market. So, these three proxies corroborate the hypothesis that manager 
exploit all the opportunities to manipulate earnings for their interests. To meet benchmark or to 
continue to increase income, managers work on different items. Taking into consideration 
abnormal accruals, Defond and Park (2001) suggest that investors could perceive that earnings 
surprise derive from these items, thus they revise their forecast due to the limited time effect of 
accruals. They are not long lasting, so the authors state that if income increasing abnormal 
accruals augment the level of good news, investor would decrease their expectation, because 
they know that the underlying earnings surprise is lower. Moreover, Petroni et al. (2000) 
demonstrate that discretionary revision on loss reserves are related to lower future profitability 
and perceived high risk. Thus, Dechow et al. (2010) suggest that investors’ response to 
different accruals component is variegated, it could be positive or negative, it is not one way. 
Finally, they state that for what concern AAERs, firm subject to misstatements are penalized in 
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market valuation due to reputational penalties. So, we can conclude that for this consequence 
EQ proxies provide mixed results. 
1.3.2.4 Real activities 
In this section the analysis deal with investments decisions related to EQ proxies. 
Indeed, outside investors consider lot of elements before providing capital to one firm instead 
of one other; earnings quality is a component in the decision-making process of investing. 
Biddle et al. (2009) provide evidence that higher financial reporting quality reduces moral 
hazard and adverse selection, thus it improves the allocation of capital and investment 
efficiency. They also demonstrate, using discretionary accruals as proxy for their analysis, that 
accounting quality could produce both over and under investment, it depends on firm specific 
characteristics.  Instead, McNichols and Stubben (2008) focus on how intentional activities, 
such as earnings management, could affect investment decisions. They analyse a group of 
companies that intentionally misstate earnings, or they were subject to SEC enforcement. They 
find that these firms, during the period of earnings manipulation, over invest. Nevertheless, 
they do not analyse external user as Biddle et al. (2009) do, therefore they cannot assess how 
they are affected by these actions. 
1.3.2.5 Executive level compensation 
Earnings, but also other ratios provided by financial statement, are used by the Board to 
set CEOs’ compensation, the variable part of their wages. Thus, managers have big and personal 
incentives to manipulate these measures in order to get rewarded. Of course, this could lead 
to lower earnings quality and higher earnings management. One of the most proxy used within 
this consequence of EQ is earnings persistence (Dechow et al., 2010). Indeed, when CEOs use 
extraordinary item to meet the compensation level required, earnings persistence would 
decrease due to these special items. The response of the Board is twofold: it could take away 
from the compensation the positive influence of these components, to assure a more consistent 
compensation for the CEO (Dechow et al., 1994), or it could not be able to identify these or 
consider them not an extraordinary event (Dechow et al., 2010). These two visions are based 
on two papers that analyse different source of non-recurring gains; for the former restructuring 
charges and the latter securitization. The common limit in both studies is that they focus on 
only one situation, while the group of possible sources for manipulate upward earnings is ample. 
Therefore, even if is straightforward that in both cases earnings persistence is lower, the 
consequences on compensation is not.  
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Finally, for what concern other proxies the literature is limited on restatement and 
timeliness, the result provided by Dechow et al. (2010, pp. 388) that analyse more than 300 
papers on EQ is:  
“Studies also suggest that expected earnings quality, measured primarily by 
timeliness, is associated with ex ante compensation contract design, while changes in 
earnings quality, measured by the incidence of restatement, are associated with ex post 
recontracting”. 
 
1.3.2.6 Executive level labor market outcomes 
Earnings are not only the benchmark used for compensation, they give a signal of 
companies performances. In a situation of poor performances, the likelihood for managers to 
be fired is higher. Moreover, in these cases the quality of earnings is mostly poor, hence 
replacing managers could be a consequence of lower EQ (Dechow et al., 2010). 
Nevertheless, it is not obvious that when companies engage in poor performances or poor 
earnings quality, CEO or CFO are replaced. Indeed, Agrawal et al. (1999) provide evidence 
that firms committing fraud are not keener in changing managers than a sample of firm 
noncommitting fraud. Furthermore, Beneish (1999) analyses companies alleged by SEC of 
overstating earnings. He finds that in this sample of 64 firms the turnover of CEO after the 
discovery of restatement is similar than the period before this event.  
Instead, Desai et al. (2006) finds that about 60% of companies that restate earnings 
between 1997-1998 change at least one top manager. Moreover, Menon and Williams (2008) 
provide evidence that companies that experienced audit resignation are more likely to replace 
top managers. 
All these studies, as Dechow et al. (2010) suggest, take into consideration event of 
extreme lower EQ and they work on situation where earnings management is crystal clear. On 
the contrary, Engel et al. (2003) focus on accounting information in situation not extreme as the 
previous studies. They analyse more than one thousand CEOs turnover, using timeliness as 
proxy. They provide evidence that, when earnings timeliness is high or there is less noisy in 
earnings, director rely more on accounting number when deciding on turnover than stock prices. 
The conclusion on this topic is a mix of evidences, therefore it is important to have 
clear in mind the decision context in which scholars are operating, because every situation 
is different as the consequences therein. Thus, also the proxies used could not be perceived as 
substitutes, because they capture different aspect of the same topic (Dechow et al., 2010).  
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1.3.2.7 Cost of equity capital   
Information presented in financial statement are fundamental for investors when they 
decide to choose where to put their money. Indeed, the bottom line is the most important line 
item considered by these persons. Therefore, earnings quality is crucial in determining the cost 
of equity capital, because it could play a key role. However, there are different proxies of EQ 
and the magnitude differs among them. Francis et al. (2004) compare cost of equity for investors 
who want to provide capital to companies and the effect on seven metrics on this. They divide 
proxies into accounting-based and market-based. The former is composed by accrual quality, 
persistence, predictability and smoothness; whereas the latter by value relevance, 
timeliness, and conservatism. They analyse data for 27 years, 1975-2001, and they test these 
seven measures to assess which one has the biggest influence on cost of capital. They also 
conduct control test using firms specific attribute in order to take away innate factor that could 
influence the overall result. They find that accounting-based proxies have bigger impact than 
market-based; moreover, accruals quality is the one that seem to have the most powerful 
influence on cost of equity. Moreover, Francis et al. (2005, pp. 315) provide evidence that: 
“accruals quality plays a statistically and economically meaningful role in determining the cost 
of equity capital”.  
Of course, all the measures are inversely associated with this consequence. In fact, 
higher the quality of the metric lower the cost for investors. Finally, they also use different 
calculation for cost of capital to validate their finding, and they provide evidence of robustness 
among all the measurements.  
For what concerns smoothness, McInnis (2010) provide evidence that higher 
smoothness is not associated with lower cost of capital; instead he proves that these results 
documented in previous literature are driven by the bias optimism in analysts’ forecast.  
Furthermore, Core et al. (2008, pp. 20) replicate and challenge test used by Francis et 
al. (2005) and they state that: 
“First, we point out that the time-series regressions of contemporaneous excess 
returns on risk factor returns conducted by FLOS do not provide evidence that a 
candidate asset (e.g., the AQ factor) is a priced risk. Thus, these tests do not update 
beliefs about whether or not accounting quality, though important and interesting, 
affects expected returns. Second,we test whether AQ is a priced risk factor using both 
cross-sectional and time-series regressions shown to be appropriate for this purpose in 
the finance literature. For completeness, we also examine cross-sectional regressions of 
returns on AQ as a characteristic (instead of covariance). Using these traditional tests, 
we find no evidence consistent with the hypothesis that AQ is a priced risk factor.” 
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For the remaining proxies, Dechow et al. (2010) suggest that AAERs is associated with 
higher cost of capital, while there is a mixed evidence on the consequences of internal control 
deficiencies under SOX 404 on cost of equity capital.  
 
1.3.2.8 Cost of debt capital 
Literature for this topic is limited, unless the common view is the same as for cost of 
equity capital; indeed, lower earnings quality reverses into higher cost of debt (Dechow et al., 
2010). Francis et al. (2005) calculate accruals quality for 31 years with samples that ranges 
from 1500 firms to 3500 per year. They estimate abnormal accruals using Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model, the Jones model (1991), and the modified Jones model (1995). Using all these 
data, they provide evidence that companies with lower accruals quality have higher cost of 
debt, namely a higher ratio of interest expense to interest-bearing outstanding debt. Graham et 
al. (2008) use restatement as the proxy for their analysis, namely they focus on term loan 
contracting after restatement. They concentrate on spread basis over Libor and they find that 
contracts made after fraudulent restatement show higher spread, thus higher cost of debt, shorter 
maturity, more covenants restrictions and the number of lenders decreases after this event, thus 
the contracting power of those companies goes down.  
Therefore, it is possible to say that cost of debt and equity suffer from lower EQ. 
Hence, scholars could develop the former in order to validate even more the latter. Moreover, 
Dechow et al. (2010, pp. 389) suggest two points: “1) to examine accounting choices that are 
irrelevant to quality characteristics of interest to equity markets, and 2) to assess trade-offs 
between multiple incentives for producing high-quality earnings”.   
 
1.3.2.9 Analyst 
Also in this case literature is not so developed. The most important issue derives from 
the assumption of analyst efficiency, namely analysts are assumed to give unbiased and 
corrected forecast of future earnings. Therefore, forecast variation is driven by changing in EQ. 
The advantage in respect of studies based on market return, that requires market efficiency 
similar to the analyst efficiency, is that the forecast rely only on earnings, while market takes 
into consideration other elements, that could affect the accuracy of the test on earnings quality 
because it capture other information not contained in them. Nevertheless, the analyst efficiency, 
as the assumption of market efficiency, is questionable (Dechow et al., 2010). However, 
scholars are divided into positions: there is a group that provide evidence that in cases of 
earnings management (see Coles et al., 2006), analyst could anticipate this misconduct and 
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properly take into consideration it in their forecast; thus, they are not affected by earnings 
manipulation. Whereas, other authors (see Teoh and Wong, 2002) state that analyst could not 
fully detect and be aware of this action, therefore they forecast are biased.  
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Chapter 2.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this section, it is developed the empirical part of the thesis. In the literature revision 
it is underlined the problem presented in most of the papers, that are biased in their analysis due 
to the inability of accounting system to report the fundamental performances of a company. 
This issue creates an initial biased that cause studies to be less accurate. Moreover, there is 
another factor that is not well developed in literature, that is the business model of a company. 
Indeed, within an industry there could be more than one way to do business and this choice 
could have a big impact in profitability of firms, but also it could be a determinant for increasing 
or decreasing EQ. In fact, most of the paper are based on the analysis between different 
industries or cross countries, unless this division could be distorted because of the business 
model factor that is not take into consideration in their analysis. Of course, studying the EQ 
within an industry in a specific region lead to other problems, such as the lower number of 
observations or some factors that are connected with that specific region. 
Despite these possible problems, we decide to investigate the importance of business 
model, that is the innovative part of the study, but also to concentrate on peculiar accounting 
choice of the industry chosen, that is one typical way to study a topic. 
The first goal of this research is to verify whether the Eikon score for EQ is somehow 
correlated with the models used by scholars in their analysis and to calculate, within those 
measures, the components that mostly explained the Eikon metric. This is important because 
Eikon measures could be a new model to be analysed for future analysis in earnings quality, 
unless the correlation with one or more models is so high that it would be possible to substitute 
the former with the latter. After that, the study concentrates on the influence of business model 
on EQ, therefore this is in the field of earnings quality determinants. This topic is not well 
developed in literature; therefore it is a good opportunity to give an initial boost for it. Indeed, 
business model could be an innate factor that would have consequences on the final EQ, despite 
the model used, therefore it is important to verify the influence of this on the scores, whether 
discriminating with this would lead to big differences in the final metrics or not. Furthermore, 
we verify also the impact on earnings quality by the accounting choice, namely LIFO and 
WEIGHTED AVERAGE vs FIFO, and whether the use of derivatives for commodities could 
be a discriminant for higher or lower EQ.    
Finally, studying different topics as business model, accounting choice and risk attitude, 
under different method for EQ, gives us the possibility to compare these proxies, whether they 
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behave in the same way or not, if they describe the same characteristic under that specific 
contest, or if they behave in the same way but catching different pattern of the topic. 
 
2.1.1 Hypothesis 
The first part of the analysis deals with the examination of Eikon metric and the possible 
correlation with some of the models presented in literature. Indeed, the focus is on proxies 
referring to accounting numbers, so external factors, target beating, timely loss recognition 
are not taken into consideration.  
The importance of this first step is to verify whether or not scores presented by software, 
then a new “generation” for earnings quality measures, could be correlated with the literature 
and so they do not differ from what has been studying in last decades. On contrary, in case of 
lower or absence relation, this new form of proxy could be integrated in the analysis. Moreover, 
we concentrate also on the components of the different models equation, as there could be 
possible to have correlation of them, without having it at proxy level. This would happen 
because StarMine and models base their measure on similar accounting number, whereas the 
calculation of the final score is different. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis is twofold: 
H1 a: There is a positive correlation between Eikon score of EQ and models chosen from 
literature. 
H1 b: The components of earnings quality measures are determinants of Eikon score. 
Then, the analysis concentrates on three determinants, that are peculiar for the food 
processing industries, namely business model, accounting treatment of inventory and 
covering commodities risk. The business model could be a new way to divide companies other 
than the typical industry division; moreover, in food processing we identify the choice of 
producing frozen or fresh food to determine how to run the business.  
For what concerns accounting principle, we focus on inventory because this item is very 
important for the companies analysed, as they have to manage it at their best to extrapolate the 
maximum. Moreover, firms chosen are based in U.S.A so they applied U.S GAAP, where it is 
possible to apply also LIFO. Therefore, this second determinant become even more interesting, 
even though it has already studied by scholars. 
Finally, in their inventory firms have raw materials that are quoted in the market, as 
corn, pork or coffee. So, the value of their expenses but also revenues and inventory could 
fluctuate during the annual year, as the price of these materials moves. So, commodities risk is 
typical in food processing, therefore it is interesting and not so presented in literature, to analyse 
the effect on EQ when companies decide to cover commodity risk with derivatives or not.  
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The hypotheses for this second step are: 
H2a: Business uncertainty is associated with lower earnings quality. To test that we use business 
model based on frozen vs fresh. 
H2b: Accounting criteria have effect on earnings quality. To test that we compare FIFO vs 
LIFO or WEIGHTED AVERAGE. 
H2c: Covering commodities risk determines higher quality of earnings. 
In conclusion, the importance of this second part is also to test whether the proxies 
provide the same results or mixed evidences under the same proxy, and what feature of the 
determinant are capturing with their score. 
 
2.2 Structure of the analysis 
The sample of the companies is provided by Eikon, precisely we search companies in 
the food processing sector based in the USA. The group is made of 50 listed companies and 
the observation goes from 2009 to 2018; all the elements for the analysis are provided by Eikon 
that gives the possibility to download in Excel: Balance Sheet, Income Statement and Statement 
of Cash Flow. Furthermore, 10-Ks for each company, that are fundamental to gather the 
information about business model, accounting method for inventory and commodities 
derivatives, derive from different sources: the site of a company, Eikon and last10K.com.  
The structure of the analysis is twofold, firstly we compare the earnings quality 
measures provided by Eikon with 7 measures of earnings quality most used by researchers: 
Jones model (1991) (EQ1), modified Jones model (1995) (EQ2), Dechow and Dichev 
approach (2002) (EQ3), Francis  et al. (2005) (EQ4), earnings persistence (EQ7) and the 
two ratios for earnings smoothness (EQ5 and EQ6). The goal of this first step is to find a 
possible correlation between the StarMine model and the literature and to see what components 
of the different models specify better the Eikon EQ. After having completed this first analysis, 
we decompose the companies in our sample using different parameters. The most important 
and the core of the study is the Business model approach, indeed we divide the sample looking 
whether the company manufactures frozen or fresh food, because the management of the 
process in the value chain is different in these two cases and therefore the business model at the 
inception is different. Of course, the majority of the companies produce both frozen and fresh 
food, so we perform the analysis more times using different thresholds to define a company 
business model, in order to provide more robust results.  
Moreover, we provide other distinctions based on the accounting method chosen by the 
companies to calculate inventory, namely first-in first-out (FIFO) vs others (last-in last-out 
(LIFO) and WEIGHTED AVERAGE), if the company hedge commodities risk, this is 
54 
 
important because in this sector every enterprises deal with raw materials such as coffee, corn 
and others, that have their own quotation in the market, therefore the price of such items can 
change over time and triggers losses.  
 
2.3 Possible correlation between Eikon and literature 
The StarMine model presented in Eikon provides a rank for earnings quality measures 
for every companies in the sample. The score varies between 0 and 100, where 100 means the 
highest value for quality, whereas 0 is the lowest. Therefore, the score provides a centiles 
distribution for companies, there is not an absolute value of EQ, as in the literature models. 
The score is made of different components, each of them has its own quality measures; the final 
earnings quality metric is the weighted average of them, but unfortunately we do not have the 
specification of the weightiness for each part of the measure. The components are accruals, 
cash flows, operating efficiency, exclusions. Even if we do not have a deeper specification of 
the model, we know that the model rewards more companies backed by sustainable cash flows, 
whereas penalizes the ones backed by accruals. Moreover, the rank between 0 and 100 takes 
into consideration the geographical areas, because every scores is compared to a benchmark 
that is not specific for every sub-industry, but at geographical level. Therefore, it is subject to 
some misspecification, indeed the measure could not be optimal for the analysis in the second 
step. However, it is possible to have high correlation with the scores provided by different 
models in the literature or by the various components of them, so it makes sense to analysis the 
StarMine model. Takes the case in which, for example, we would find 85% of positive 
correlation with the Jones model; in this case we would use directly the Eikon score instead of 
calculating them with this model, because of the high correlation. 
 This model is usually used for investors, because it provides a daily change in the 
metric, therefore it is possible to set a strategy based on how the score behaves. For example, 
to go short on those companies that decrease the earnings quality and long on those that increase 
it, or vice versa. Moreover, another possibility would be the one to study the trend between the 
stock price movement and EQ scores movement, but this goes beyond this analysis, as the 
picture 1 shows. The model proposed gives a multiple factor approach for investors to evaluate 
a company. 
The initial problem of this first step analysis is to determine how to compare Eikon 
score with the other metrics. Indeed, the models presented in literature do not provide a centiles 
distribution of the company, scholars take the absolute value provided by the equation, e.g. 
absolute value of nondiscretionary accruals. Therefore, to let the comparison possible, we 
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divide in quintiles, deciles, ventils the Eikon scores and the other EQ measures. To evaluate 
whether Eikon is comparable with the seven model, we perform a t test for each year and then 
for the total number of observations; this procedure is repeated for every quantiles division. 
Moreover, we also conduct simple linear regression after the t test. After that we also perform 
this process among the seven measures, typically scholars study the relationship between the 
different metrics. This step analysis could give the possibility to verify at annual level the trend 
between Eikon and the models, to provide robustness, because the results could be influenced 
by how we divide the companies in quantiles, but using four distributions gives us the 
possibility to confirm or not the correlation between the models; indeed the quintiles 
distribution could give different insight than the deciles.  
Finally, even if the t tests among the four quantiles provide the same evidence and to 
overcome the limitation of t test,  regressing the Eikon quantiles on the other metrics quantiles 
would provide even more evidence of the relation previously obtained with the t test, or it could 
demonstrate that the previous results are not satisfied with the linear regression.  
The results are consistent among the different quantiles distributions; therefore this 
gives more robustness to the analysis. So, in the following part we propose only results derived 
from the ventils and in the case there are significant differences between quintiles and deciles 
we specify that in the notes. 
 
Picture 1: representation of EQ in Eikon from https://www.refinitiv.com/en/products/starmine-
financial-modeling/starmine-investment-research-analytics. 
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2.3.1 Jones model and Eikon.  
The first model analysed is the Jones model (1991): 
𝑇𝐴௜௧/𝐴௜௧ିଵ  =  𝛼 ଵ  ×  [1/𝐴௜௧ି ]  + 𝛽ଵ௜ × [∆𝑅𝐸𝑉௜௧ /𝐴௜௧ିଵ]  +  𝛽௜ଶ  ×  [𝑃𝑃𝐸௜௧/𝐴௜௧ିଵ]  + ɛ௜௧. 
In the analysis, the definition of Total accruals is a little different from the one proposed in the 
Jones paper, because we use the one provided by Dechow et al. (1995), who adds the delta in 
short term debt to the equation provided by Jones, therefore we compute them as: 
𝑇𝐴௧  =  [𝛥𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠௧  −  𝛥𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ௧]  − [𝛥𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠௧]  
−  𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒௧  +  𝛥𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧ 
All the items are taken by the Balance Sheets provided by Eikon in standard format for all the 
companies. We compute the residuals of the model, that are discretionary accruals, for every 
companies from 2010 to 2018. The value of abnormal accruals is taken in absolute form and, 
because the higher the Eikon score the higher the quality, whereas the higher the discretionary 
accruals the lower the EQ, we introduce a minus before the absolute value to match the two 
metrics. After that, we compute the quantiles distribution for the two measures for every year 
and we conduct several t tests. The results are consistent year by year, and also among the 
different quantiles distributions. They indicate that there is no material difference between the 
mean of the two proxies.  
However, when we perform a regress analysis the results do not provide the same 
evidence, as the p value is too high. Indeed, in Table 5 is presented the Pearson correlation and 
the Spearman correlation, and it is shown that in both cases the coefficient is only 0,05 and the 
p-values are close to 0,30, so not statistically significant. Therefore, t test is unable to explain 
that the two models provide the same results because it concentrates on the mean of the 
differences by the two, so it could be possible that this one is close to 0, but the differences for 
each Company are high and there is no trend between the two measures.  
The conclusion is that the Jones model and the StarMine model for EQ do not provide 
the same results, they are independent because the Pearson and Spearman coefficient are close 
to 0, even if the latter penalize companies backed by huge value of accruals. However, the 
calculation of the first one concentrates on residuals of the equation, in Eikon there are annual 
deltas for specific accruals, so the estimations are different and so scores. Moreover, Eikon 
takes into consideration other three factors for the final proxy, therefore also this condition 
could determine more divergency from Jones model. 
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2.3.2 Modified Jones model 
The second model is the modified Jones model (1995).  
𝑇𝐴௜௧/𝐴௜௧ିଵ  =  𝛼 ଵ × [1/𝐴௜௧ିଵ]  +  𝛽ଵ௜ ×  [𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉௜௧/ 𝐴௜௧ିଵ]  +  𝛽௜ଶ × [𝑃𝑃𝐸௜௧/𝐴௜௧ିଵ]  + ɛ௜௧ 
The definition of TA is the same as for the previous analysis and all the elements are from the 
Balance Sheets provided by Eikon in standard format. Even in this case, discretionary accruals 
are the residuals of the model and we take the absolute value multiplied minus one. Then these 
ones are distributed in quantiles and the t tests for each of them for every year is computed.  
The results, not surprising, are close to the ones of Jones model. In fact, t tests from year 2010 
to 2018 provide no evidence of differences between the mean of the two proxies, even in the 
case of the t test that compare all the observations of the ten year together. 
Nevertheless, as Table 5 shows, the Pearson and Spearman correlation are 0,05 as for 
the Jones model and they are not statistically significant. Therefore, the conclusions are the 
same as the previous one. The modified Jones model and Eikon EQ measures do not provide 
the same distribution, they are independent due to the different method on how estimate 
accruals and the influence of the other components presented in the StarMine metric.  
 
2.3.3 Dechow and Dichev approach 
The other model for accruals is the Dechow and Dichev approach (2002). 
ΔWC ௧ =  β଴  +   βଵ × CFO௧ିଵ +   βଶ × CFO ௧ +   βଷ × CFO௧ାଵ + ɛ௧.   
In this case all the elements are taken from the Statement of Cash flow. Also for this equation 
residuals of the model are the discretionary accruals, taken in absolute value and matching with 
the Eikon scores, multiplying them by minus 1. The distribution in quantiles are compared with 
Eikon and we conduct t tests for each year and for all the total observation. Even in this case, 
there is no difference between the mean of Dechow and Dichev score and StarMine model, 
unless the Pearson and Spearman correlation demonstrate that the relationship of the two 
metrics is only 0,04 and not even statistically significant. Then, they seem to be independent.  
Even in this case, the difference is due to the calculation of the metric. Indeed, Eikon 
rewards companies backed by sustainable cash flows, unless the estimation is based on the 
annual change in cash flow from operation and working capital. The latter is the dependent 
variable in the Dechow and Dichev approach, whereas the independents are CFO in year t +1, 
t and t-1, so there is no variable for change in annual CFO as for the StarMine models. However, 
it is possible to expect a possible correlation between the methods because of the same 
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parameter used. Nevertheless, the final score also in this case is provided by residuals of the 
model, therefore this could lead to different quantiles distribution.  
Finally, as for the previous results, Eikon is composed by 4 parts, and CFO is only one 
of them. 
 
2.3.4 Francis et al. model 
Francis et al. (2005) start from the modification by McNichols (2002) of the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) equation, who propose to take into consideration also delta revenues in order to 
control for companies performances. They suggest analysing all the accruals and not only the 
short-term ones, therefore they use Total current accruals instead of WC and they add the 
contribution of long term accruals to the model, that are PPE. 
 
𝛥𝑇𝐶𝐴௧  =  [𝛥𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠௧  −  𝛥𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ௧]  −  [𝛥𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠௧]  
+  𝛥𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧ 
 
𝛥𝑇𝐶𝐴 ௧ =  𝛽଴  +   𝛽ଵ × 𝐶𝐹𝑂௧ିଵ +   𝛽ଶ × 𝐶𝐹𝑂 ௧ +   𝛽ଷ × 𝐶𝐹𝑂௧ାଵ +  𝛽ସ × ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉௧  
+  𝛽ହ × 𝑃𝑃𝐸௧  +  ɛ௧ 
The scores for earnings quality derive from the residuals of the model, that are taken in absolute 
value and multiplied for minus one, as in the previous model for abnormal accruals. This 
procedure gives the possibility to compare the two proxies. Another time, the discretionary 
accruals for the companies are distributed in quantiles and t test are performed at annual level 
and for all the observations. Even in this case, there is no differences between the mean of the 
two metrics, unless the Pearson and Spearman correlation provide evidence of a statistically 
significance relationship between Eikon and the Francis et al. model. Indeed, the coefficient 
are 0,1344 and 0,1355 and significant (p-value <0.05). Therefore, we could conclude that 
Francis model is correlated at 13% with the StarMine score.  
The possible reason is the specification included by Francis et al. of ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉 and PPE, 
that takes into consideration also long-term accruals and performances of companies, but also 
they change the dependent variable from WC to TCA. So, this different approach shares more 
input between the two model, as in TCA there are change in accruals presented also in the 
accruals part of Eikon, PPE are in common, but also CFO in some way are linked. Therefore, 
this model touches two components of the StarMine proxy, the accruals and cash flow ones, so 
this could be the possible explanation why there is a significant correlation and why this is 
significant and the Dechow and Dichev (2002) is not. Of course, the coefficient is low, because 
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the calculation of accruals, as for the other abnormal accruals model, is based on residuals and 
not annual change as for Eikon. 
 
2.3.5 Smoothness 
For what concerns smoothness, we use the two ratios proposed by Leuz (2003): 
𝜎(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠௧)/𝜎(𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௧) 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝛥𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠௧, 𝛥𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௧). 
Accruals are considered as defined by Dechow et al. (1995), CFO is taken directly from the 
Statement of Cash flow and for Earnings, provided by the Income Statement, we consider 
Earnings before extraordinary items; all the elements are downloaded from Eikon.  
For the first ratio, we take group of three years, therefore to calculate smoothness at year 
t we consider the standard deviation of earnings going from year t-2 to t, therefore we stop at 
year 2011. The same reasoning for Cash flow from operation. 
For the second, accruals are the same used in Jones model, so we calculate the annual 
change for them and for CFO and then the correlation is made of  observation for three year, so 
from year t-2 to year t, stopping at year 2013 because we do not have accruals in year 2009 and 
so change in accruals for year 2010. This reduce the observations. Moreover, as Leuz et al. 
(2003) state, the correlation between these two components is negative. 
However, before starting the same procedure to divide the companies in quantiles, as 
for the other proxies, it is fundamental to provide the personal interpretation of the ratio. As 
Ewert and Wagenhofer (2011) state, smoothing earnings could be seen as an intention to mask 
the real performance of the companies, thus earnings management and lower EQ, but also it 
could be a method to reduce volatility. The approach in this analysis is aligned with the former 
explanation, therefore higher value of the ratio in both cases is connected with higher 
earnings quality, because the companies do not have manipulated them for any reasons, so 
earnings could be the closest as possible to real performances.  
After having proposed our interpretation, it is possible to compare the two ratios with 
Eikon. So, the distribution in quantiles is compared with the one of StarMine model, using t test 
for each year and for the total sample. Also in this case there is no significant difference between 
the mean of the two ratios in ventils and the Eikon scores in ventils. Therefore, it is fundamental 
to estimate the Pearson and Spearman correlation to give the final consideration.  
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For the first ratio, the coefficients are negative and equal to -0,0596, so very low and 
without statistically significance. For the second one, the coefficients are 0,0180 and 0,0188 
and not significant. Thus, the two smoothness are totally independent from the Eikon score. 
 
2.3.6 Earnings Persistence 
The procedure for this proxy is different, because persistence is usually calculated at industry 
level, or for the entire group of companies. Therefore, it is not possible to calculate it year by 
year and derive the quantile distribution. So, the approach proposed is to use the basic 
equation for persistence to verify whether there are differences between companies with 
different business model, accounting treatment or risk attitude, and compare the results in the 
second step analysis with Eikon. This could lead us to provide a relationship with the Eikon 
measure, even if it would be less accurate than the procedure used for the other models. 
The model used in the analysis is: 
 
Earnings୲ାଵ =  𝛼 +  𝛽ଵ × 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠௧ +  𝜀௧ 
Where Earnings are the ones before extraordinary items, and they are scaled by total assets. 
 
2.3.7 Correlations between the models 
The conclusion in this first part is that only the model by Francis et al. (2005) is 
correlated with Eikon. Therefore, the next step is to compare, as mostly papers do, the Pearson 
and Spearman correlation among the other proxies and to evaluate whether there are 
significant differences between these results and the one provided by scholars. 
Starting from abnormal accruals model, the expectation is to find a significant 
relationship between the models, because they focus on accruals, even if the equations are 
different. Moreover, considering that the choice in the analysis is to use the absolute value of 
residuals also for the Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. (2005), instead of standard 
deviation of residuals, the correlation could be higher among these measures.  
As Table 5 shows, there is a strong linear correlation between Jones model and 
modified Jones model, indeed the coefficient are more than 0,98 and statistically significant. 
This result is not surprising because the two models differ only in one term, namely delta 
revenues are adjusted with delta receivables. Indeed, Jones et al. (2005) find out a Pearson 
correlation of 0,996 and Spearman correlation of 0,990, both statistically significant.  
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This correlation close to 1 brings that the correlation of Jones model and modified Jones 
model with the other proxies would be close in each case, with the maximum difference up to 
0,02, as Table 5 shows. Therefore, we could concentrate on the interaction between Jones model 
and the other proxies. 
For what concerns Dechow and Dichev model (2002), the Pearson and Spearman 
coefficients are 0,28 and 0,27, with p-value of 0.000. Therefore, there is a correlation between 
the model and the Jones model, unless is not so high as with Francis et al. (2005), where the 
coefficients are both close to 0,44 and statistically significant. This means that the adjustments 
provided by Francis et al. (2005) at the Dechow and Dichev (2002), delta revenues and PPE, 
enhance the dependency between the models. Indeed, these modifications are presented as 
term of the Jones model and modified Jones model, so it is reasonable to have higher coefficient.  
Jones et al. (2008) find similar coefficients for Francis et al. and Jones model, 0,46 for 
Pearson correlation and 0,40 for Spearman one, unless the value for the Dechow and Dichev  
(2002) is higher than what is shown in Table 5 and it is closer to the value of Francis et al 
(2005), in fact they obtained 0,44 and 0,40 (the value for the modified Jones models are similar).  
The possible reason is due to the lower correlation between Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) and Francis et al. (2005). Indeed, Table 5 shows that both the coefficient are close to 
0,24, whereas in the paper of Jones et al. (2008) the Pearson coefficient is 0,88 and the 
Spearman is 0,99. The reasonable explanation behind the lower correlation could be the firm 
specific characteristics that could give different results than studies based on cross 
countries or by industries. Furthermore, Jones et al. (2008) use McNichols (2002) equation, 
where the dependent variable is delta working capital, whereas we use delta in total current 
accruals, as proposed by Francis et al. (2005). This could change the results of the model and 
so the correlation. 
After the abnormal models, there are the two ratios for earnings smoothness. As Table 
5 shows, the correlation is close to 24% and highly significant. However, if compared with the 
Spearmen correlation table proposed by Dechow et al. (2010), this coefficient is too low, 
because in that paper the coefficient is close to 70%. Moreover, the results by Dechow et al. 
(2010) takes into consideration a sample of paper that goes from 1987 to 2007, therefore it 
could be the best precise in literature. Nevertheless, the lower value obtained could be the 
results of the small sample analysed and also the method chosen of taking into consideration 
three years to calculate the ratios; maybe using four or five years could lead to better results. 
On the other hand, this choice would have reduced the number of observations, that are already 
stopped to year 2013 for the second ratio of smoothness.  
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However, the big difference is on the correlation between smoothness and all the 
four abnormal accruals models. In fact, whereas Dechow et al. (2010) provide evidence of 
statistically significant coefficient between residual and smoothness, Table 5 behaves in the 
opposite direction, as the coefficient are low and not significant at all. 
Table 5: Pearson correlation on lower left and Spearman correlation7 on upper right between 
Eikon and EQ models distributed in ventils, without persistence. 
 
Even in this case the explanation of this matter could be due to the sample size analysed  and 
also the choice done during the analysis, such as taking CFO directly from the Statement of 
Cash Flow instead calculating it as some scholars do, or also for what concern the modified 
version of Dechow and Dichev (2002), and finally, as just explained, the calculation of earnings 
smoothness. Moreover, the models are taken using the ventils distribution, that could diminish 
the quality of results. 
So to provide more robustness, we perform the same correlation matrix using the 
absolute term of the model, instead of the quantiles distribution. In this case we do not take 
into consideration Eikon proxy and persistence as in the previous case. 
As Table 6 demonstrate, there are some differences in coefficients between the correlation in 
quantiles and with terms taken as they are. Indeed, the Pearson coefficient between EQ3 and 
EQ1/EQ2 is lower for about 8% than in Table 5, but the significance level remains the same. 
On the other hand, the Spearman parameter are different for less than 2%. The major 
differences are presented for the EQ4. In fact, the Pearson correlation with Jones model is 
 
7 ** when p value is significant at <0,05, * when it is <0,10. 
Eikon EQ1 EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6
0.0519 0.0519 0.0409 0.1355** -0.0596 0.0188
0.2960 0.2953 0.4389 0.0102 0.2525 0.7563
0.0510 0.9821** 0.2661** 0.4362** -0.0450 0.0453
0.3039 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3830  0.4523
0.0512 0.9819** 0.2805** 0.4170** -0.0444 0.0544
0.3026 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3891 0.3663
0.0400 0.2655** 0.2797** 0.2407** 0.0033 0.1067
0.4484 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9529 0.1081
0.1334** 0.4358** 0.4166** 0.2399** -0.1465** -0.0333
0.0115 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0079 0.6171
-0.0596 -0.0443 -0.0441 0.0037 -0.1464* 0.2629**
0.2528 0.3909 0.3926 0.9469 0.0079 0.0000
0.0180 0.0442 0.0534 0.1073 -0.0326 0.2631**
0.7665 0.4633 0.3753 0.1061 0.6245 0.0000
Smoothness 1
Smoothness 2
Eikon
Jones model
 Modified Jones model
Dechow and Dichev
Francis et al.
63 
 
0,61 and with the modified Jones model is 0,58, whereas in the quantiles distribution the two 
parameters are 0,44 and 0,42, almost 20% less. Also the correlation between EQ3 and EQ4 is 
higher in this case, 0,36 in respect of the previous 0,24; therefore a value closer to the one found 
by Jones et al. (2008). Nevertheless, the Spearman coefficients are close to the one of the 
quantiles distributions.  
The reason of these big differences could be explained by the choice to distribute the 
proxies in quantiles to be comparable with the Eikon score, but this would produce less accurate 
results among the proxies. On the other hand, the Spearman results are similar in both tables 
because this type of correlation measures the association between two ranked variables and in 
the quantiles distribution the values are already ranked, therefore it is highly probable to have 
similar results. 
Finally, for what concern smoothness the only differences are in the coefficient values, 
as the relationships with EQ1 EQ2 and EQ3 remain not statistically significant. Indeed, the 
value between smoothness1 and EQ4 is lower for 3% in respect of the one in table 5, but also 
the parameter between the two smoothness is only 20%, whereas in the previous case is 26%; 
therefore is even more far from the value proposed by Dechow et al. (2010).  
In conclusion, there are no material discrepancy between the two tables, therefore the 
distribution in quantiles is a good estimation because it does not differ too much from the table 
with absolute term.  
 
Table 6: Pearson correlation8 on lower left and Spearman correlation on upper right between 
the six proxies of EQ  
 
 
8** when p value is significant at <0,05, * when it is <0,10.  
EQ1 EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6
0.9841** 0.2570** 0.4383** -0.0509 0.0410
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.3234 0.4958
0.9825** 0.2666** 0.4199** -0.0522 0.0623
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3116 0.3003
0.1878** 0.2087** 0.2972** 0.0180 0.0986
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7449 0.1377
0.6099** 0.5817** 0.3599** -0.1405** -0.0160
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0108 0.8097
-0.0664 -0.0752 0.0139 -0.1132** 0.2677**
0.1976 0.1444 0.8014 0.0405 0.0000
0.0399 0.0329 0.0325 0.0272 0.2075**
0.5075 0.5853 0.6259 0.6827 0.0005
Francis et al.
smoothness 1
smoothness 2
Jones model
 modified Jones model
Dechow and Dichev
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2.3.8 The effect of the EQ measures components on Eikon score 
Furthermore, we estimate for each of the six models the effect of their components on Eikon 
score and their explanatory power. The procedure consists in calculating the difference, for 
every part of the various measures, between the value at company level and the mean value of 
the sample. Then the results are taken in absolute value and, as before, distributes in quantiles 
to lead the regression meaningful. The analysis is initially computed for each year and 
singularly for every model, then, continuing the year division, the Eikon scores in quantiles is 
regressed on all the components. Finally, the regression takes into consideration all the year 
observations. Also in this case there are two steps, the first is at model level and then for all the 
proxies together.  
As the Table 7 shows, the three components of the Jones model and modified Jones are 
significant with p-value less 0,001, the t statistics in brackets are very high. The coefficients are 
between 0,25 and 0,36, therefore it seems that these components could affect in part the Eikon 
score. Furthermore, this provides more evidence that the calculation methodology for 
earnings quality is crucial, because the abnormal models calculate residuals from the 
regression, whereas the StarMine method concentrates on deltas in respect to a benchmark, 
unless the items from financial statements taken into consideration are the same. Finally, the 
constant is not considered for the two models, because part 1 is already the intercept of the 
regression  
A similar reasoning is for the Dechow and Dichev approach (2002) and the Francis et 
al. model (2005). The first part, that is CFO of t +1 is not meaningful, but this is predictable 
because in StarMine methods there is not this component; whereas, Eikon considers delta in 
cash flow from operation, therefore the other two parts are statistically significant, even if the 
coefficient is lower than for the Jones model components. Furthermore, for what concerns 
Francis et al. (2005) the two adjustments to the Dechow and Dichev approach (2002) result 
different from 0, because these two additional components are presented also in Eikon method. 
For both proxies we calculate the constants, that are statistically significant and equal to 6,8 and 
10,0 respectively. This is important because in the hypothetical case of a value of 0 for the 
components the Eikon quantiles would be 6 or 10, thus even if the coefficient are positive and 
significant, the huge value of the constant means that there are a lot of  information not taken 
into consideration. Indeed, StarMine derive the metric from four different characteristic, 
whereas in this case we are dealing with only one, cash flow part and in part with accruals for 
Francis et al. (2005), despite its constant has a bigger value than the EQ3 one. The best scenario 
would be a parameter close to 0. 
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For what concerns the two ratios for earnings smoothness, the coefficients are 0, so there 
is no effect on Eikon score. 
Finally, we provide a regression with all the components in two ways: one 
considering the constant and the other without constant, because the part1 of Jones model is 
already the intercept of the model, so we use these two approaches. 
 
Table 7: Regression9 of the EQ components taken in ventils on Eikon score in ventils, singularly 
and together.   
 
In the case of the regression with constant, the first two parts of the Jones model and the 
adjustment of modified Jones model are not statistically different from zero. This happens also 
in the case of not considering the constant, however the coefficients of the first two part in the 
Jones model in the second case are negative, but not significant. Whereas the 3 part, PPE over 
total assets, increases the value in both cases, from 0,28 to 0,45 and 0,55.  
Cash flow from operation in t+1 are still not different from 0 as in the case of the stand-alone 
regression of EQ3 and EQ4. On contrary, CFO in t and CFO t-1 are still significant at 0,05 
level, namely the values are higher in regression without the constant, whereas for the part 2 is 
 
9 ** when p value is significant at <0,05, * when it is <0,10. 
EQ1 EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6 Total Total no constant
0.3582** 0.3549** -0.1057 0.0134
(7.35) (7.28) (-1.65) (0.20)
0.2453** -0.0456 0.0589
(4.76) (-0.20) (0.24)
0.2857** 0.2821** 0.4478** 0.5483**
(5.90) (4.86) (3.07) (3.43)
0.2516** -0.0185 -0.0281
(5.83) (-0.08) (-0.11)
-0.0453 0.0045 -0.0251 -0.0065
(-0.68) (0.07) (-0.30) (-0.07)
0.2391** 0.1424* 0.2493**
(3.49) (3.52) (1.68) (2.72)
0.1364** 0.3074** 0.3633**
(2.13) (2.53) (3.87) (4.18)
-0.6180** -0.5323**
(-3.70) (-4.21) (-3.30)
-0.1561** -0.0547
(-3.88) (-2.46) (-0.81)
-0.0431 0.0665 0.2215**
(-0.83) (1.08) (3.50)
0.0264 0.0089 0.1315**
(0.44) (0.15) (2.04)
6.827** 10.0403** 10.6671** 10.0683** 10.3327**
(9.98) (10.90) (17.40) (14.20) (6.81)
observations 410 410 361 360 370 275 225 225
smoothness 2
constant
part 4 Francis
-0.1822**
part 5 Francis
-0.1908**
smoothness 1
part 2 Dechow and Dichev
0.2319**
part 3 Dechow and Dichev
0.1555**
part 1 Jones model
part 2 Jones model
part 3 Jones model
part 2 modified Jones model
part 1 Dechow and Dichev
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higher in the case of the singular regression, while part 3 increases when all the component are 
regressed. 
For what regards the modification proposed by Francis et al. (2005), the coefficient of 
delta revenue received a huge boost in the total regression, from -0,18 to -0,62 and -0,53 
respectively. 
On the opposite side, delta revenues over total assets are not significant in the regression 
without constant. 
However, the most meaningful results are the ones dealing with smoothness. Indeed, for 
both ratios, the regression with constant provide evidence of statistically significant coefficient, 
namely 0,22 for smoothness 1 and 0,14 for smoothness 2.  
In order to explain the differences between the coefficient of the components in the 
solo regression of the six EQs and the two versions of the total components, we analyse the 
correlation between each part of the models, because it possible that some components become 
not significant due to the high correlation with other elements, that, on contrary, are still 
significant.  
Starting with the first part of Jones model, we observe in Table 8 a correlation with the 
third part of the Jones model, the first part of Dechow and Dichev, the two adjustments proposed 
by Francis et al., and also the first ratio for earnings smoothness. Therefore, when we use the 
total regression, the coefficient is not significant, and in the case of using the constant it 
becomes even negative due to the possible correlation with the intercept itself, as the Jones 
model does not require the constant in the regression.  
Then, the second part of Jones model is strongly correlated with the modified version, 
96%, and also with CFO in year t+1, CFO in year t and delta revenue over average total assets. 
So, it is straightforward that this coefficient become equal to zero. Moreover, in the regression 
with the constant, the parameter becomes negative due to the addition of the intercept.  
PPE over total assets in year t-1 increases its coefficient in the regression with all the 
components. It is strongly correlated with the first modification of Francis et al., 89%, of course 
they share the same numerator, it changes only the denominator. Moreover, there is a 
correlation about 9% with the first part of Dechow and Dichev.  
For the modified version of the model the reasoning is the same as for the version of the 
Jones model, so it is no more significant due to the correlation with other components of the six 
proxies. 
CFO in t+1 remains not statistically different from zero, whereas CFO in year t remains 
statistically significant in both versions of the total regression, unless in the case of the constant 
the coefficient is lower than in EQ3 and EQ4 models and in respect of not using the intercept. 
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Maybe this is due to the correlation with the latter that could diminish the value of this 
parameter.  
Finally, CFO in t-1 more than doubles in both total regressions. As Table 8 shows, these 
three components are all correlated one with the others.  
The biggest increase in absolute value is the one of part 4 of the Francis et al. model, 
that is correlated with part 1 and 3 of Jones model and modified Jones. So it possible that a part 
of the information contained in the first part of Jones that is not more significant is gathered by 
this component, because part 3 is still statistically different from 0.  
The second adjustment of Francis, delta revenues over average total assets, is correlated 
with all the other element, except from part 3 of Jones and the second ratio for earnings 
smoothness. However, if in the case of using the constant, this coefficient remains statistically 
different from zero, as in the regression of EQ4, in the case of not using the intercept, the 
parameter becomes equal to 0. Therefore, there is a possible correlation with the constant that 
is presented in both the EQ4 regression and the first method of total regression, thus removing 
the intercept has an influence on the value of part 5.  
For the last two ratios of earnings smoothness there is an opposite situation of the one 
just described above. Indeed, in the case of the regression without the constant, the two 
coefficients become statistically different from 0. Maybe the reason behind this change is the 
intercept removal that makes them statistically significant. 
The conclusion is that the correlations among the various components of the models 
make some of them no more significant, and this is predictable as they are similar in the 
composition.  However, the important part of the analysis in this step is the effect of the constant 
on some elements, that from not significant, as for earnings smoothness, become different from 
0, but also vice versa, as for the 5 part of EQ4. So, what of the two formats should we use it is 
an interesting point, and there is not a definitive response. On one side, Jones model and 
modified do not require the constant, but also the two ratios are regressed on Eikon considering 
the intercept, while they are simply ratios. Moreover, the value of the constant is very high 
considering that we are dealing with ventils distribution. 
On the other side, the intercept is presented in Dechow and Dichev and Francis et al.; 
furthermore it is statistically significant and it gather an important information: the different 
component of the proxies could be effective on the StarMine score, unless in case of their 
increase would be 0, Eikon would provide a ventils of 10. While if the components would be 
able to provide more information about the model, the constant should be closer to 0. 
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Table 8: Pearson correlation10 on lower left and Spearman correlation on upper right between 
each component of the six earnings quality scores. 
 
Moreover, we provide two robustness checks to the two total regressions in order to 
validate more what we have just described. Indeed, we calculate year dummies to verify 
whether there is a possible year effect on the variable. In fact, we should expect a constant 
pattern, namely to have results very similar year by year, not having huge differences due to 
effect of specific year factors that would decrease the results obtained in the total regression 
that consider all the year together. 
Furthermore, the other control is the cluster by companies, because the expectation is 
that a company should remain in the same quantiles year by year, or not differs too much. The 
same for the parts of the proxies. For example, if the earnings smoothness ratios for company 
x is in the 18 ventils, it should stay 18 each year or not fluctuate too much. 
Therefore, the first control is with cluster. As table 9 shows, there is no material effects, 
because the coefficients remain the same, the only thing is that t statistics are lower, but this 
could derive from the cluster analysis. So, the total regression does not suffer from companies 
effects. 
Instead, there are year effects in the case of the regression without constant, while there 
is no effect in the case of the regression with the intercept. The bigger changes are on CFO in 
year t that becomes less significant and the coefficient is the same as in the case of using the 
 
10** when p value is significant at <0,05, * when it is <0,10.  
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constant, as Table 9 shows. While the two smoothness ratios are no more significant and they 
return to the level of total regression with the constant. Therefore, being strongly significant the 
year dummies in the second regressions, the intercept is even more determinant in this case.  
 
Table 9: Regression11 for all the components with two controls: clustering for each company 
and by year dummies, with and without the intercept. 
Year 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2018 are not presented because of omitted variable as for 
some ratios we could not provide scores for each year. 
 
11** when p value is significant at <0,05, * when it is <0,10.  
Total Cluster Control Total no constant Cluster no constant Control no constant
-0.1057 -0.1057 -0.1057 0.0134 0.0134 -0.1057
(-1.65) (-1.31) (1.30) (0.20) (0.17) (-1.30)
-0.0456 -0.0456 -0.0512 0.0589 0.0589 -0.0512
(-0.20) (-0.21) (-0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (-0.23)
0.4478** 0.4478** 0.4501** 0.5483** 0.5483** 0.4501**
(3.07) (2.55) (2.58) (3.43) (2.49) (2.58)
-0.0185 -0.0185 -0.0143 -0.0281 -0.0281 -0.0143
(-0.08) (-0.08) (-0.06) (-0.11) (-0.11) (-0.06)
-0.0251 -0.0251 -0.0259 -0.0065 -0.0065 -0.0259
(-0.30) (-0.29) (-0.31) (-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.31)
0.1424* 0.1424 0.1419 0.2493** 0.2493** 0.1419
(1.68) (1.56) (1.51) (2.72) (2.93) (1.51)
0.3074** 0.3073** 0.3090** 0.3633** 0.3633** 0.3091**
(3.87) (3.52) (3.44) (4.18) (3.97) (3.44)
-0.6180** -0.6180** -0.6198** -0.5323** -0.5323** -0.6198**
(-4.21) (-3.30) (-3.31) (-3.30) (-2.37) (-3.31)
-0.1561** -0.1561 -0.1567* -0.0547 -0.0547 -0.1567*
(-2.46) (-1.95) (-1.92) (-0.81) (-0.61) (-1.92)
0.0665 0.0665 0.0678 0.2215** 0.2213** 0.0678
(1.08) (1.29) (1.30) (3.50) (3.65) (1.30)
0.0089 0.0089 0.0091 0.1315** 0.1315* 0.0091
(0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (2.04) (1.68) (0.14)
-0.6621 10.0797**
(-0.72) (3.86)
10.7408**
(4.22)
-0.7321 10.0087**
(-0.77) (3.97)
-0.4782 10.2626**
(-0.46) (3.78)
-0.1934 10.5474**
(-0.19) (4.08)
10.3327** 10.3327** 10.7408**
(6.81) (4.14) (4.22)
observations 225 225 225 225 225 225
year 2013
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
year 2014
year 2015
year 2016
year 2017 
constant
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So, omitting the intercept could induce to state that there is a year effect on the 
components, unless the dummies values are big as the constant. Moreover, there is no 
differences in the coefficients between the model with control and constant and model without 
constant and controls. This is a strange results, it provides evidence of a correlation between 
year dummies and the constant, because when we regress using both parameters only the 
intercept is statistically significant with a value of 10, whereas when we omit it, year dummies 
become significant with values around 10; while, the other components have the same value. 
Then, without controlling for year, using the regression with and without constant, even 
with clustering, lead to dissimilar results, while controlling for years gives the same values.  
Therefore, the possible conclusion is to adopt the regression with constant when 
analysing all the components, because it is robust to the controls applied and at the end the 
results are equal with the regression without intercept and controlled by year and cluster.  
Nevertheless, when there are the analysis of Jones model and modified Jones model, the 
constant should not be added as the methods state. 
 
2.4 Business model as a determinant for earnings quality 
In the business model canvass Osterwalder and Pigneu (2009, pp. 14) give the definition 
of business model: “A business model describes the rationale of how an organization creates, 
delivers, and captures value”. The logic behind this sentence is that a company could employ a 
variate and unique way to create value for customers, it could concentrate on the products, on 
the distribution channels, on niche segments etc… What is important about the statement is that 
the choice of the specific business model impact all the company in its entirety, therefore 
the accounting system is not unable to detect this complexity, but also the classification based 
on industry is not sufficient to explain this fact. Moreover, the barriers between industries 
nowadays are not demarked as in the previous years, due to the internet expansion and the 
possibility to be transversal among different industries or to move among them (Kotler et al., 
2017). 
The reason of performing the analysis using the business model derives from these 
changing in the definition of industry and also because it is a topic not so developed by scholars. 
The choice of frozen versus fresh it is easy to understand and maybe too simple to catch all the 
complexity, but it is a starting point. Moreover, in food processing it is a good method to divide 
companies, because the supply chain would be different due to the problem of guaranteeing the 
right temperature for frozen products, but also the inventory system should be different, and the 
machineries used in plants.  
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Furthermore, to provide robustness to the study, but also because there is not a straight 
definition to determine that a company it is frozen based or fresh based, we provide a fourfold 
classification. The first one simply divides company between the companies that have no 
frozen products with the firms with at least one. The second and the third fix a threshold to 
identify whether a company is considered frozen based, namely 10% and 20% of total revenue 
should derive from not fresh food. The quarter, instead, is based on the segment analysis 
presented in Annual Report, namely if a company report a frozen segment or not. This latter is 
the key definition for the analysis, as we would present results only under this distribution. But, 
also because it an objective choice, because the other three suffer from threshold defined, 
whereas the segmental reporting is provided by companies, thus it is not subject to subjectivity. 
So, the procedure to determine if there are differences between the two business model 
is straight forward, indeed we perform a t test for each of the EQ proxies, in this case also for 
earnings persistence, and we analyse whether the mean difference between the two options is 
significant different from zero, but also which of Frozen and Fresh has the higher value in 
earnings quality. Moreover, this could lead to compare the results among the proxies, if they 
are in the same direction or if they differ.  
The analysis is conducted twice, firstly using absolute values of the proxies and then 
using the quantiles distribution, in order to test whether there could be significant difference in 
the two cases and to provide robustness to what we find. Of course, for the second version we 
exclude earnings persistence as it is a measure for to all the sample. 
 
Table 10: T test12 for frozen based and fresh based companies, distribution considered in 
absolute values. 
 
 
12 ** when p value is significant at <0,05, * when it is <0,10. 
FROZEN FRESH DIFFERENCE P-VALUE
EIKON 55.2121 48.8008 6.4113** 0.0289
EQ1 -0.0442 -0.0616 0.0175** 0.0149
EQ2 -0.0447 -0.0612 0.0165** 0.0155
EQ3 -0.0234 -0.0274 0.0039 0.1828
EQ4 -0.0470 -0.0599 0.0129* 0.0911
EQ5 2.4713 1.3675 1.3675** 0.0332
EQ6 -0.2482 -0.4382 0.1900** 0.0204
EQ7 0.6193 0.5988 0.0205 0.9131
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As Table 10 shows, the mean difference is more than 0 for all the cases, therefore 
companies with at least one frozen segment have higher earnings quality. Moreover, despite 
EQ3 and EQ7, p values are less than 0.10, namely except for EQ4, the significance value is 
lower than 5%.  
The same results are shown in Table 11, so even quantiles distribution provide evidence 
that processing frozen food is a determinant for more EQ under different proxies. In addition, 
EQ5 and EQ6, so smoothness, are significant with a value lower than 0.01. Only EQ4 seems to 
not provide evidence of differences between the two business models, however in the absolute 
distribution the results describe more quality for frozen based companies. 
 
Table 11: T test for frozen based and fresh based companies, distribution considered in 
ventils. 
 
*T test are performed using also the other three methods to distributed frozen and fresh 
companies, using also quintiles and deciles. Results are in line with those presented. Values in 
bold identify higher EQ. 
 
These proxies provided capture different insight of the topic in question. Indeed, Eikon 
score shows that frozen companies are closer to the benchmark of 100 quality, thus they are 
backed by more sustainable cash flows and not have higher value of accruals. This latter 
aspect is capture by EQ1, EQ2, EQ3 and EQ4, the abnormal accruals model; indeed the 
residuals of the model are lower in case of frozen based companies. 
Finally, the two ratios for earnings smoothness provide evidence that companies that 
produce only fresh food are more active in smoothing earnings, thus they mask their volatility 
and maybe they do not provide the real performances. 
 
 
FROZEN FRESH DIFFERENCE P-VALUE
EIKON 10.9697 9.7195 1.2502** 0.0302
EQ1 11.12941 9.800 1.3294** 0.0200
EQ2 11.0647  9.844 1.2207** 0.0326
EQ3 10.9470 9.9378 1.0092** 0.0945
EQ4 10.3400 10.3227 0.0173 0.9775
EQ5 11.9677 9.2826 2.6851** 0.0000
EQ6 11.4336 9.5636 1.8699** 0.0076
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2.5 Accounting choice as a determinant for earnings quality 
The peculiarity of the U.S. GAAP for the accounting method is the possibility to 
estimate the inventory using last-in first-out (LIFO), in addition to the first-in first-out (FIFO) 
and WEIGHTED AVERAGE. Indeed, under IFRS, the IAS2 does not allow companies to 
choose the LIFO, whereas under the ASC 330 this is possible.  The reason behind this choice 
is explained in ASC 330-10-30-9, that states: “The major objective in selecting a method should 
be to choose the one which, under the circumstances, most clearly reflects periodic income”. A 
possible interpretation of this sentence is that the accounting choice should be influenced by 
the industry (Flood, 2016). Therefore, the normal expectation is to have companies adopting 
the same accounting treatment for inventory within the same industry, because the 
“circumstances” should be the same under an industry in the same region.  
However, the sample in the analysis shows that only 60% adopts FIFO, the other 40% 
uses LIFO or WEIGHTED AVERAGE. So, it is important to verify whether the accounting 
choice could be a factor that determine a different EQ. As Flood (2016) suggests, LIFO is more 
a tax income concept, therefore a company could evaluate inventory at LIFO for tax purpose, 
unless it does not match the physical flow of material.  
Moreover, this method is not allowed under IFRS, so it could be possible that choosing 
LIFO or WEIGHTED AVERAGE instead of FIFO could be for earnings management, target 
beating, income smoothing etc…  
The goal of this part is to verify these last assumptions, using all the seven models from 
literature and also Eikon scores. Therefore, the group of 50 companies is divided into two 
layers. The first one is composed by companies adopting the FIFO category as the only 
accounting treatment and by companies that in a mixed situation, namely they use two or three 
methods for different items, FIFO is the most used13. The other category, instead, is composed 
by companies that for the majority used LIFO or WEIGHTED AVERAGE, so it is a residual 
category.  
In order to evaluate whether there are differences in EQ between these two groups, and 
also which group has the higher earning quality, we develop a series of t tests for the quantiles 
previously adopted and for each of the models in question, to verify if all the models behave in 
the same way or not, and what aspect of the topic one model catches.  
Table 12 and Table 13 provide evidence that companies adopting FIFO have lower 
earnings quality, unless EQ6 is the only measures that goes in the opposite direction (as EQ3 
is not statistically different from 0, in particular for what concerns the ventils distribution). 
 
13 To estimate the most used, we calculate the percentage of inventory accounted using FIFO on the total value of 
inventory. 
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Table 12: T test14 for companies applying FIFO and companies applying LIFO or WEIGHTED 
AVERAGE, distribution considered in absolute values. 
 
Table 13: T test for companies applying FIFO and companies applying LIFO or WEIGHTED 
AVERAGE, distribution considered in ventils. 
 
*Decile and quintiles parameter do not provide significantly different coefficients from the ones 
presented. Values in bold identify higher EQ. 
 
In addition, Eikon, EQ1, and EQ2 present p value less than 1% in the case of t test with 
absolute term, whereas under quantiles distribution the p value goes a little up. Furthermore, 
EQ3, EQ6 and EQ7 are not statistically significant from 0. Therefore, 3 out 8 models provide 
evidence of more quality in companies applying LIFO or WEIGHTED AVERAGE, in one 
method is goes in the opposite direction, two methods describe no difference between the 
accounting treatment and Francis et al. differs between the result in absolute term and in ventils. 
The situation in this case is more complex than before due mixed results. The majority of them 
would provide evidence of higher EQ for companies that do not decide to use FIFO for 
inventory, however it is not possible to affirm that in every situation applying LIFO of 
WEIGHTED AVERAGE determines higher quality. Thus, it is important to analyse the 
 
14** when p value is significant at <0,05, * when it is <0,10.  
OTHER FIFO DIFFERENCE P-VALUE
EIKON 55.6954 48.2025 7.4929** 0.0088
EQ1 -0.0431 -0.0628 0.0196** 0.0066
EQ2 -0.0441 -0.0621 0.0181** 0.0083
EQ3 -0.0261 -0.0256 -0.0005 -0.1795
EQ4 -0.0454 -0.0615 0.0161** 0.0372
EQ5 1.3723 2.1178 -0.7455* 0.0718
EQ6 -0.3511 -0.3682 0.0171 0.8319
EQ7 0.6593 0.5918 0.0675 0.7303
OTHER FIFO DIFFERENCE P-VALUE
EIKON 11.0115 9.6414 1.3701** 0.0151
EQ1 11.0454 9.8279 1.2176** 0.0316
EQ2 10.9432 9.9016 1.0415* 0.0660
EQ3 10.3589 10.3318 0.0272 0.9641
EQ4 10.7500 10.0233 0.7266 0.2375
EQ5 9.7278 10.8062 -1.0783* 0.0693
EQ6 10.4701 10.2174 0.2527 0.7189
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meaning behind the results for Eikon, EQ1, EQ2 and EQ5. The results found for Eikon EQ1 
and EQ2 are in line with Krishnan et al. (2008) who analyse the relation between FIFO and 
LIFO and accruals quality, under Francis et al. models. They provide this explanation to what 
they found:  
 “An intuitive understanding of how inventory policy affects earnings variability and 
accruals quality can be obtained by the following reasoning. Under LIFO (assuming no 
dipping into reserves), the cost of good sold is better matched in time with the revenue 
and therefore, the variability of the cost of goods sold reflects the variability of input 
material price in a short period between the assumed purchase date of the material and 
the sale date of the finished product. However, under FIFO, the variability of cost of 
goods sold reflects the variability of input material price over a longer period over which 
the material is assumed to be held. Furthermore, because the LIFO cost of goods has 
lower variability, it becomes more risky for managers to deliberately insert opportunistic 
discretionary accruals in the LIFO cost of goods sold account. This increased risk faced 
by managers under LIFO inhibits the insertion of such accruals. Both these factors point 
towards a lower variability of LIFO earnings.  If we assume that the inventory policy 
does not affect sales and other firm-specific sources of variability, the lower variability 
in LIFO earnings will be reflected as a lower AQ, i.e., a better accruals quality”. 
Thus, using LIFO provides less accruals and then discretionary ones, so these bring 
to have higher quality for Eikon, EQ1 and EQ2, namely in Jones and modified Jones model the 
score is residuals from the model, so abnormal accruals; whereas also Eikon has the accruals 
components and it penalize companies with huge value of these. 
Of course, this explanation is reductive as the companies apply also WEIGHTED 
AVERAGE in the sample, so the results are less robust than paper of Krishnan et al. (2008). 
For what concerns smoothness, FIFO is an income increasing method, whereas LIFO 
is more for tax purpose, because it reduces taxable income. Thus, the reason behind higher 
quality for companies that decide to choose FIFO instead of LIFO or WEIGHTED AVERAGE 
is because these firms should have more volatile income than the second one, all the other 
elements fixed. Therefore, higher volatility higher ratios and so higher earnings quality and 
less earnings smoothing. Of course, inventory is one of the multiple factors that influences the 
bottom line, so this reason is too much simple as there could be other elements that increase or 
decrease income standard deviation and thus determine higher or lower ratio. 
In conclusion, this case provide evidence that the different model presented in literature 
capture different insight of the same determinant, and so it is not possible to univocally affirm 
that FIFO vs other decreases earnings quality, while it is possible to analyse the different results 
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of the same determinant under different quality aspects, because the models used focus only on 
one part of the entire topic.   
 
2.6 Commodity risk as a determinant for earnings quality 
In food processing one of the risks faced by companies is surely commodities risk. Indeed, they 
buy agricultural products, such as wheat or coffee, whose price fluctuates in the market, causing 
losses but also gaining. Even the value of inventory, despite of the accounting treatment, suffers 
from this type of risk. Therefore, a company, in order to diminish it, could buy some derivatives 
to fix the future income or expenses, so to reduce volatility or to avoid future losses.  
Nevertheless, derivatives are complex instrument and they are costly, sometimes they 
could not be able to cover appropriately the risk. Furthermore, there is the possibility for natural 
hedge when the value of what you will have to buy in future is close to what you will sell, 
therefore the two positions automatically match each other, without be necessary to hedge risk. 
Unfortunately, this does not happen so frequently in the real world. Finally, a company could 
also decide to bear the risk and not enter into a derivative contract.  
For the analysis, we want to identify whether decide to cover the risk or not could 
determine higher or lower earnings quality. As for the previous analysis, we perform several 
t tests with value in absolute term and for robustness we provide also the distributions in 
quintiles, deciles, ventils for each model. 
Table 14 and Table 15 provide evidence that the mean of companies that decide to cover 
commodities risk is higher, despite the ventils distribution for EQ5, however the p value is high, 
so the result is not statistically significant.  
For this determinant, the Eikon score describe that there is no difference between the 
means, whereas all the other proxies, except for earnings persistence, provide a strong evidence 
of higher earnings quality in case of deciding to cover the risk. In fact, EQ1, EQ2 and EQ4 
show a significance level lower than 1% in both Table 12 and Table 13, whereas EQ3 is at 5% 
level in the distribution with absolute term and at <0.001 in ventils. Finally, the second ratio for 
earnings smoothness is significant at 0.10 level.  
Furthermore, it is possible to state that covering commodities risk is reflected in higher 
value, both for what concern discretionary accruals, as they are lower, and smoothness, as it is 
higher. The reason for these results could be the lower cash flow variability, because with the 
use of derivative the companies is aware of the future outcome, thus the volatility is reduced. 
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Table 14: T test15 for companies covering commodity risk and companies not covering, 
distribution considered in absolute terms. 
 
Table 15: T test for companies covering commodity risk and companies not covering, 
distribution considered in ventils. 
 
* Decile and quintiles parameter do not provide significantly different coefficients from the 
ones presented. Values in bold identify higher EQ. 
  
Moreover, the choice of covering risk could induce to smoothing earnings, because the 
volatility of CFO is reduced, unless EQ5 provide evidence that this not happens because the 
differences is equal to zero, rather, even if not statistically significant, the coefficient is higher 
for covering. Indeed, the second ratios for smoothness concentrate on correlation with accruals 
and CFO and it is higher for companies covering risk, so they do not use abnormal accruals to 
mask real performances. 
For this determinant the proxies go in the same directions and describe similar 
characteristics. 
 
15 ** when p value is significant at <0,05, * when it is <0,10. 
NOT COVER COVER DIFFERENCE P-VALUE
EIKON 50.4123 52.39 -1.9777 0.4939
EQ1 -0.0685 -0.0395 -0.0290** 0.0002
EQ2 -0.0681 -0.0399 -0.0282** 0.0001
EQ3 -0.0286 -0.0228 -0.0058** 0.0495
EQ4 -0.0725 -0.0357 -0.0369* 0.0000
EQ5 1.6536 1.9885 -0.3349 0.4713
EQ6 -0.4308 -0.2871 -0.1437* 0.0712
EQ7 0.6011 0.5961 0.0049 0.9810
NOT COVER COVER DIFFERENCE P-VALUE
EIKON 10.0142 10.4400 -0.4258 0.4536
EQ1 9.4037 11.3465 -1.9429** 0.0005 
EQ2 9.4541 11.2921 -1.8379** 0.0011
EQ3  9.5969 11.1556 -1.5586** 0.0088
EQ4 9.000 11.7486 -2.7486** 0.0000
EQ5 10.6847 10.0055 0.6792 0.2519
EQ6 9.7133 10.9704 -1.2571* 0.0704
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2.7 Earnings persistence and Eikon 
In the analysis of the three determinants, accounting treatment, business model and 
covering commodities risk, we introduce earnings persistence, as it refers to value at industry 
or sample level. We demonstrate that there are no differences for this measure under the three 
determinants. The possible reason is due to the sample methodology adopted, as for all the 
year every companies remain within the same layer, namely Company X, for example, adopting 
FIFO from year 2009 to 2018, covering risk from 2009 to 2018 and has a frozen segment from 
2009  to 2018. Thus, there are no change from one group to the other. The consequence of this 
is that there are no reasons to have more persistence in one group or in another, because there 
are no changings during years. There are no expectations to find more constant earnings for 
firms that cover risk than ones that do not do so, because they follow their choice consistently 
year by year. And this is true for business model and accounting treatment. It would be better 
to analyse the pattern of companies shifting from one method or model to the other and to 
calculate the persistence of these groups for a considerable amount of year. But this goes beyond 
the analysis. 
Nevertheless, the point is how to estimate a possible correlation with Eikon score. 
Indeed, the latter provide evidence of difference in earnings quality for the two determinants: 
accounting treatment and business model. Moreover, in the composition of the final measure, 
the StarMine method does not take into consideration the item earnings at all, unless it stated 
that: “StarMine EQ employs a quantitative multi-factor approach to predict the persistence of 
earnings”. Therefore, earnings persistence is the key point in Eikon score, but it is treated 
in a different way from the model proposed that simply regresses current earnings of 
future ones. 
Taken all this information, the conclusion is that the model for earnings persistence is 
not correlated with Eikon. However it could be a future development, starting from the 
statement reported above, to study the correlation with the equation proposed by Sloan (1996): 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠௧ାଵ =  𝛼 +  𝛽ଵ ×  𝐶𝐹௧  +  𝛽ଶ  ×  𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠௧  +  𝜀௧ 
It would be interesting to study it because it takes into consideration the cash flow and accruals 
components of earnings, two parts presented also in Eikon scores. 
2.8 Robustness check 
The final step of the analysis is to provide more robustness to the results found for each 
determinant, using the t test to compare the means. Therefore, the reasoning is to regress each 
of the measure for earnings quality, except for persistence as it gives no difference among the 
three determinant options and because it is a sample level, using three dummies. The first one 
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is called FIFO and it is equal to 1 if companies applied this method for inventory or 0 if they 
do not. The second one is called COVERING, that is 1 if companies use derivatives or 0 if 
they do not cover the commodities risk. The third one is FRESH and it is equal to 1 in case of 
no frozen segment and 0 otherwise. Moreover, we introduce also the combination of the 
dummies, so FRESH x COVERING, COVERING x FIFO and FIFO x FRESH as it could 
be the case that the combination of the determinants would provide significant results and 
because there could be some correlation between these.  
Moreover, we apply the same controls as done for the components part of the different 
EQ proxies, namely clustering by companies and year dummies, in order to verify whether 
there are year effects, therefore it could be the case that one or more years provide different 
pattern in quality results, and with the cluster we control for companies trend. Indeed, the 
expectation is to find, for example, that covering is qualitative superior in each year, so the 
dummies should be equal to zero. For the other control, we know that cluster would reduce the 
p value of the three dummies, nevertheless the meaning behind the use of this is that one 
companies, under one of the three dummies, should not change the quantiles year by year, but 
should remain the most constant possible. Because, if the companies change year by year the 
quality, results in the previous step would be biased by this trend. This reasoning is valid also 
for the case of term in absolute value and not only for quantiles regression; in fact, we test also 
this second case to provide more robustness. 
Therefore, the expectation prior to check with these controls is to find the same 
coefficient as in the t test analysis, namely, for example, if FIFO has lower earnings quality 
under EQ1, the coefficient of the regression within EQ1 should be negative; this replied for all 
the proxies and the three determinants. 
For what concern Eikon score, the t tests provide evidences of better quality for 
companies applying LIFO or WEIGHTED AVERAGE and for companies with one frozen 
business segment; whereas there was no statistically difference for cover or not cover the risk. 
Table 16, indeed, shows that the two dummies FIFO and FRESH are negative, however the p 
value is lower, but this could be due to the cluster effects. Moreover, the year dummies are not 
significant, so there is no influence by year trend. For what concerns the distribution with 
absolute term, results are similar, unless there is a year effect in 2012, that is statistically 
significant at 10%. Even in this case covering is not significant.  
The results change when we apply the regression with cross dummies. Indeed, the 
coefficients become positive, but p values go down. Instead, the cross dummies are negative 
and with high p value, considering the clustering effect. In fact, the FIFO x FRESH has a 
significance value of 10%. This finding is in line with t test because that cross dummies 
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demonstrate negative correlation when companies choose FIFO and have no frozen segment. 
Furthermore, the other two cross dummies are negative with high t statistic; these could explain 
why the first three dummies are in this case positive, because the correlation between the 
dummies reduce the value for the dummy taken singularly. The same situation is provided with 
absolute term, where FIFO x COVERING is significant at 10%, however there is still the year 
effect in 2012. 
Therefore, we could give robustness to the results of the previous t tests as the change in the 
sign of FIFO and FRESH could be due to the introduction of the combined dummies, that are 
negative so in line with the expectation to find less quality for them; moreover the p value are 
not significant. Indeed, the expectation of dummy 1 x dummy 3 would be with positive sign, 
due to the combination of two negative effect, unless there could be possible correlation with 
the stand-alone dummies. 
The second model is the Jones model, where covering, using LIFO/WEIGHTED 
AVERAGE and being a frozen based company produce higher earnings quality. Indeed, the 
coefficient are negative, positive and negative, so we find the results expected in the t tests. 
However, the p values are lower, due to clustering. Only cover dummies is significant with p 
value <0.1 in quantiles distribution, while in the absolute term the p value is lower than 5%. 
Also in this case, quantiles distribution do not suffer from year effects, whereas in Table 17 we 
find that year 2017 has a negative coefficient with an high t statistics. Nevertheless, we could 
conclude that there are no material change year by year.  
Then, the further step is to apply the cross dummies. In this case, in Table 16 we find 
that cover dummy increases its significance in ventils distribution, unless in the other Table is 
the opposite. Moreover the fresh dummy, that does not change the sign of the coefficient, 
reduces significantly the t statistics in both cases. While, the coefficient of the first dummy 
become positive and also with p value <0,10. This could be due to the cross dummy nr 1, that 
is negative and statistically significant. In fact, the negative effect of FIFO dummy could be 
intercepted by this one that is statistically significant at <0,10 as we expect that the combination 
between the positive effect of cover and negative of LIFO becomes with negative sign. 
Furthermore, also the second cross dummies, FIFO x FRESH, is negative and, being both with 
a negative sign, another part of the coefficient is capture by 1 x 3. For the distribution with 
absolute value the results are different for cross dummies, namely the coefficients are equal in 
sign, but in this case the 1 x 3 is significant at 10%, and not the 1 x 2. But this could not change 
the reasoning applied for quantiles regression. 
However, while for covering and business model Table 16 and Table 17 support the 
evidences of the precedent t tests, we could not affirm with the same certainty for FIFO.  
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Similar results are for modified Jones model, so we could refer to what just described 
for Jones model. 
For Dechow and Dichev model, the results describe an absence of difference in earnings 
quality for companies when they choose FIFO or LIFO/WEIGHTED AVERAGE, whereas 
there is more quality when a company decides to cover commodity risk or one it has at least 
one frozen segment. Indeed, in both Table 16 and 17 only covering risk is in line with the results 
of t test, as FIFO dummy is positive and it has the same t statistics of FRESH dummy, unless 
this one is negative. Thus, the first conclusion is that the previous relationships are confirmed, 
but it appears that choosing FIFO results in higher value of EQ. Therefore, it is important to 
study the coefficient response to control for cross dummies. In fact, FIFO dummy increases the 
coefficient and also the significance, while covering diminishes its t statistics, but it is not a 
problem. However, the most important problem is driven by business model, indeed in the 
quantiles regression it become equal to 0, while in Table 16 from negative becomes positive. 
The possible explanation is the negative coefficient of the dummy FIFO x FRESH that could 
capture some information contained in the fresh dummies and it is in line with the assumption 
that companies choosing FIFO and fresh food would diminish the quality, as the starting point 
is a neutral position for the first choice and negative for the second; unless the p value is higher 
than 10%. 
Finally in both Table 16 and Table 17 there is no year effect. 
So, the first conclusion is that covering risk remains significant even after the controls, 
while business model diminishes its validity and FIFO seems to determine higher earnings 
quality as the significance is higher than FRESH dummy. Therefore, on one hand results from 
t test about using derivatives means higher quality, on the other FIFO could determine more 
earnings quality under EQ3, while there is no absolute certainty to confirm the previous results 
on business model, so fresh equal to lower quality. The possible explanation of the differences 
between the t tests is that Dechow and Dichev is not robust to cluster effect, so the companies 
trend could bias the final scores for these two determinants. 
For EQ4 there are differences between quantiles and absolute term distribution, as for 
the former only covering risk produces higher quality and the other two determinants has no 
statistically mean differences, whereas for the latter, FIFO, not covering and fresh are translated 
into lower quality. Thus, the expectation is to find a trend for the three dummies as negative, 
positive and negative, at least the second dummy should be statistically significant in both Table 
16 and Table 17.  
In fact, this latter hypothesis is the one realized, indeed only the covering dummies is 
positive and statistically significant at 5% in both distributions. Nevertheless, while in the 
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quantiles distribution there are no year effects, in Table 16 there are three year out of seven that 
are significant at 5%, year 2013-2014-2017. Therefore, there is a strong year incidence for this 
distribution.  
The most important results, however, is found when control with cross dummies, indeed 
in both Table 16 and Table 17, FIFO dummy coefficient is positive, especially for the quantile 
distributions. Thus, remaining under this case where there are no year effects that could bias 
other coefficients, we concentrate on the controls added to try to explain the behaviour of the 
FIFO dummy. Indeed, FIFO x COVER has a negative coefficient that is significant at 5%. So, 
considering that covering has positive effects, it could be that the choice of FIFO brings the 
negative score for earnings. However, also fresh dummy increases the coefficient when adding 
the control, unless FRESH x COVER is negative and also FRESH x FIFO. Therefore, the same 
reasoning of FIFO could be valid for fresh, as business model is not statistically significant as 
a determinant for EQ4. 
The complexity of this metric is high; thus we could conclude that cover risk provide 
more earnings quality, what the trend of the other two determinants is not easy to define under 
this model as results are at odds. 
For the first ratios of earnings smoothness we expect to find such coefficient: positive, 
both negative and positive but not significant, and negative, as t tests provide evidence of more 
quality when companies choose FIFO, no difference between use derivatives or not, and higher 
scores in case of companies with one frozen segment.  
Indeed, the results for FIFO dummies are both positive between the two tables, for 
covering one is negative and the other is positive, but t statistics are low and for fresh they are 
both negative and with p value at <0,10 and <0,05. Moreover, there are no year effects. There 
is possible cluster effect on FIFO as the t statistics are not as higher as for fresh.    
In column b Table 17, so adding controls, we find that FIFO coefficient becomes 
negative, however in FIFO x COVER and FIFO x FRESH the coefficients are positive, 
therefore a possible explanation is that the information included in the solo version is captured 
by these new dummies.  
While in Table 16, the fresh dummy becomes positive, but not significant at all, 
therefore the reason could be that the information is translated in the new dummies. 
Therefore, we could affirm that in this case results of t test are confirmed and robust 
to cluster and year. 
Finally, for what concerns EQ6 the expectation from t test is to find this pattern: 
positive/negative, positive, negative.  
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Table 16 and 17 provide evidence that the coefficients follow the expectation, as FIFO 
is not statistically different from zero, cover is positive, but the t statistics is not high as for 
Fresh that is negative, this could be due to cluster effect, however what is important is the sign 
of the dummies that are in line with the t tests. Moreover, there are no year effect in both 
quantiles and absolute term distributions. Then, when the cross dummies are introduced, the 
sign of the coefficients do not change for fresh and cover, the latter become less statistically 
significant and the former increases; while the value for FIFO becomes negative, but not 
significant. The possible reason for the lower significance level for the dummy cover is due to 
the introduction of the cross dummies that reduce the information contained in the single 
dummy. So, we could conclude that the robustness checks for EQ6 confirm what found in 
the previous analysis. 
The conclusions after the checks are: 
 T tests provide evidences with 5 over 7 metrics of more earnings quality when companies 
apply LIFO or WEIGHTED AVERAGE; unless after robustness check we could not be 
as sure as before, because the cross dummies change the coefficient of this value to higher 
value and there is cluster effect on EQ3, EQ4 and EQ5. 
 Covering is the only determinant to be robust in every proxy, so we could strongly 
affirm that companies that choose to cover commodity risk produce higher earnings quality. 
 For business model there are cluster effects that diminish the significance of the coefficient 
found, unless the sign is in line with the expectation. Therefore, we could not be in the same 
case as for covering, but we quite state that companies with at least one frozen segment 
determine earnings quality. Moreover, we replicated the analysis using different 
threshold, even if they are subjective, to determine the case of frozen or fresh companies, 
and we find results in line with the one proposed, so this add more robustness to the 
analysis.  
The quantiles regressions were replicated with deciles and quintiles, but there are no significant 
differences from the one just presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
Table 16: Regression16 for each EQ proxies considering the three dummies of FIFO, COVER 
and FRESH, year dummies and clustered by companies in column a, while in column b it is 
considered also the intersections between dummies. The distributions considered are in ventils. 
 
 
 
16 ** when p value is significant at <0,05, * when it is <0,10. 
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Table 17: Regression17 for each EQ proxies considering the three dummies of FIFO, COVER 
and FRESH, year dummies and clustered by companies in column a, while in column b it is 
considered also the intersections between dummies. The distributions considered are absolute 
term. 
 
 
 
17** when p value is significant at <0,05, * when it is <0,10.  
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3 Conclusions  
In this work are firstly illustrated the most used model for earnings quality in literature. 
We propose to cluster these measures in three groups, following Dechow et al. (2010): 
properties of earnings, investors responsiveness to earnings and external indicator of 
earnings. For each proxy we describe the scholars’ papers that introduce them and also the 
modifications proposed by other authors, as for Jones model (1991) and modified Jones model 
by Dechow et al. (1995). Moreover, we identify the robust part for every method and also all 
the limitations.  
Furthermore, we classify papers based on whether earnings quality is the dependent or 
independent variable, thus in determinants or consequences of EQ (Dechow et al., 2010). 
Then we identify the most studied determinants and we illustrate if the proxies behave in the 
same way or in the opposite directions, because every measure captures a specific insight of 
the topic in question, so it is wrong that one metric could be a substitute for the others. In 
addition, the possibility that one measures provide higher quality and another lower is due to 
the aspect of quality analysed by these proxies, because they concentrate on different items of 
annual reports or they have divergent focus. The same reasoning for consequences. 
The second part of the analysis is divide in two parts, one focuses on introducing a new 
score for EQ, namely StarMine model presented in Eikon; the second one concentrates on 
three determinants and how they influence earnings quality: business model, accounting 
treatment for inventory and covering commodity risk. 
For what concerns Eikon metric, the analysis provide evidence that, despite Francis et 
al. (2005) model, this measure is not correlated with the ones used in literature, namely the 
proxies under the category properties of earnings(Jones model, modified Jones, DD, earnings 
persistence, smoothness). Whereas, we demonstrate that components of the methods are 
correlated with the StarMine methods. The reason behind this is that literature proxies and 
Eikon share several items, unless the procedure for the final score differ and this is why the 
metric are not correlated. Indeed, Eikon takes into account four parts and for each of them 
provides an EQ that are subsequently united to bring the final score, precisely accruals, cash 
flows, operating efficiency, exclusions. Furthermore, we show the Pearson and Spearman 
correlation among the components of the models and we find some similarities with scholars 
but in major part the coefficients are lower than other papers due to the sample size. Indeed, we 
focus on 50 companies within an industry, while most studies are cross countries and cross 
industries, thus this is a big limitation of this analysis. 
Finally, we demonstrate that companies choosing FIFO instead of LIFO or WEIGHTED 
AVERAGE could have in first step with lower earnings quality (only smoothness t test 
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provide evidence of higher quality of FIFO, but this is expected) , unless the robustness checks 
(companies cluster, year dummies and cross dummies) reduce the validity of t tests, so we 
would not affirm with 100% accuracy that this accounting choice is always linked with lower 
quality. Furthermore, having a discrepancy between abnormal accruals proxies and smoothness, 
we could support the hypothesis that each proxy focuses on specific characteristic of the 
determinant in question and they describe a part of the entirety, thus is reasonable to have also 
results going in different directions.  
Instead, the use of derivatives to cover commodities risk is a determinant for higher 
earnings quality and this result is valid also after robustness checks. Therefore, we are quite 
sure that cover risk is equal to higher EQ. For this proxy the models provide evidences of lower 
use of nondiscretionary accruals by companies, because the ratios of smoothness, the 
correlation between delta accruals and delta CFO, is higher for these firms. Thus, it seems that 
they describe the same picture of this characteristic.  
Finally, the third determinant under this second part is the business model. Indeed, this 
analysis is a starting point for future development of this topic, as literature is little. The study 
demonstrates that, under the 4 definitions of business model provided, companies producing 
fresh food are lower in EQ. Moreover, the results of t test are robust to year effects, while the 
coefficient diminish the significance due to cluster effects. 
In the end, we show that earnings persistence is not correlated with Eikon and does not 
provide evidence of differences in the determinants. Nevertheless, this model is not accurate 
for this analysis because it is used for industry analysis and not at company level, thus it 
reasonable that suffers from the sample size. But also, there are no year shifting at company 
level form one choices to other, so there are no reasons to expect more persistence in one group 
rather than in the other. 
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Appendix 
The first part of appendix deals with the evolution of abnormal accruals models, indeed 
we provide the reference model for each of them, the modification/innovation introduced in 
respect of their starting point and their limitations. 
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In this section are illustrated the criteria applied to determine the business model, the accounting 
treatment and hedging.  
So, start with the first one determinant, we bring some examples that describe the different 
situation under the 4 divisions proposed to provide more robustness to the analysis. The first 
one is the segmental reporting, where we search in the annual report the section segment 
descriptions, and we look whether one of the segments contain the word frozen or deal only 
with frozen food.  
As the picture describes, in the case of Archer Daniels Midland there are no frozen segment, 
because no one contains the word in question or is made of only frozen food. 
 
Moreover, to check the last hypothesis we search whether in the 10-K is reported the word 
froze, in order to provide evidence to the fact that this company process only fresh food. Indeed, 
the word is only used as a verb and not as an adjective. So this leads to the conclusion that 
Archer Daniels Midland produce only fresh food under the 4 definition given in the empirical 
part. 
 
On the other hand, Brigford Foods Corporation is considered a frozen based company, because 
it issues a segmental reporting based on frozen and fresh products, the percentage of the former 
is more than 20%, so it respect the threshold in both definition 2 and 3, and of course it has 
almost one frozen product so it is in line with definition 1. 
 
 
 
104 
 
 
Then, for what concerns accounting treatment we search in the notes the accounting principle 
applied for inventory. In the case of Archer Daniels and Midland there is a mix of methods to 
calculate the inventory, thus we calculate whether FIFO is more than 50% or not. In this case, 
this does not happen, so the company is considered in the other accounting treatment group. 
 
On contrary, there are case in which only FIFO is applied, as for Dean Food Company. 
 
But also there are situations where FIFO is not considered at all, as for Kellogg Company. 
 
Finally, we analyse whether a company decide or not to cover commodity risk. To do so, we 
search in 10-Ks the part relative to derivative instruments and hedging activities. In fact, in this 
note is provided by companies if they cover this type or risk or not. In the case of Archer Daniels 
Midland is presented the choice to use derivatives to hedge the fluctuation of agricultural prices. 
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On contrary, there are companies, such as Brigford Foods Company, that are aware of the 
negative impact of the raw material price fluctuations in the market, but they do not enter into 
derivatives contract and try to pursue other strategy. 
  
 
